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Abstract: The current paper addresses the Chinese-initiated Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa through a 
case study of the Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ). The paper investigates the development potential of 
this innovative cooperation strategy for Africa based on the theoretical foundation of an unbalanced growth-
strategy, offering a new perspective of understanding the role of SEZs as a development tool. In extending the 
theoretical foundation to include the role of global values chain, the potential for the EIZ to be a tool for 
development in Africa hinges on the four criteria of ensuring dynamic economic growth in the zone, creating 
strong backward linkages from the zone, the presence of firms conducive to join the global value chain in the 
zone and the working cooperation between the zone’s main actors. The findings of the study show that while 
SEZs have the potential to be tools for development through an unbalanced growth process, the prospect for the 
EIZ to be such a tool is currently small as the EIZ does not fulfill the four criteria. However, if the policy frame 
surrounding the zone is improved, if more firms conducive to global value chains and appropriate to the 
Ethiopian context fills the zone and if the cooperation between the actors is reformed, the EIZ has the potential 
to improve this prospect and become a valuable development tool for Ethiopia in line with the theory of SEZs as 
an unbalanced growth strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last decade the economic cooperation between China and Africa has increased 
dramatically as the flow of trade, aid and investments has witnessed an almost explosive 
growth. The China-Africa trade increased to over $100 billion in 2010 (IMF 2011), and the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM, reports that the Chinese FDI to Africa reached 
$2.1 billion in 2010
1
 (MOFCOM 2009, 2010). The increased cooperation has also been 
expressed through the tri-annual meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 
FOCAC, initiated in 2000, the creation of the China-Africa Development Fund, CADFund, in 
2006 and China’s Export-Import Bank’s large-scale commitment to export-related finance 
across Africa (FOCAC 2013, CADFund 2011, China Ex-im Bank 2011). In relation to the 
Beijing Summit, the high-profile 3rd meeting of FOCAC in 2006, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao announced eight measures to forge and strengthen the Sino-African cooperation. As 
part of this pledge to increase the development assistance, debt relief and preferential loan 
agreements, Hu Jintao also announced that China intends to establish three to five Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa (Hu Jintao 2006). During China’s own rapid development 
process, the four SEZs set up in 1979 and the subsequent opening up of 14 coastal cities 
during the 1980’s are perceived to have played an important, growth-fostering role 
(Cheesman 2012). In the Chinese case and in other SEZ-success stories, such as South Korea 
and Mauritius, the use of SEZ has been an important tool to promote economic growth and 
structural transformation in the initial phase of development. While the development of these 
successful zones has been well-documented, little is currently known about the new, Chinese-
initiated SEZs in Africa. With the notable exception of the works of Deborah Brautigam 
(2009, 2010, 2011, Brautigam and Tang 2011, 2012a), little academic attention has been 
given to the progress of this new type of economic cooperation between countries. The 
Chinese overseas SEZs were initiated in 2006 and while most of the zones still are in their 
infancy, there is substantial scope to increase the current knowledge of their development. It 
is the aim of this study to expand on this knowledge through addressing the interlude between 
the topics of increased Chinese engagement in Africa and the potential of SEZs as 
development tools. Is the strategy of Chinese-initiated SEZs a promising and innovative 
development tool, or is it a tool to further Chinese interests in Africa without links to African 
development objectives? In order to address this overarching question, the Chinese-initiated 
                                                     
1
 The reliability of Chinese official statistics on outward FDI is often questioned, but MOFCOM’s recorded 
increase of Chinese FDI to Africa from $74.8 million in 2003 to $2.1 billion in 2010 nonetheless indicates the 
dramatic increase that has taken place, even though the actual figure is likely to be higher.    
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SEZ the Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ) in Ethiopia is researched as a case in point. During the 
past decade Ethiopia has experienced rapid economic growth, at an average of 10.6% during 
2004-2012 (Goh & Geiger 2012a). The future challenge for Ethiopia’s economy is to 
transform the high growth rate into sustainable development, a process that can only happen 
through a structural transformation. Structural transformation is in the current study 
investigated within the frame of Albert Hirschman’s framework of unbalanced growth. 
Within this frame one sector of the economy should be prioritized as the leading sector, and 
the EIZ is viewed as such a prioritized sector.  
Despite the potential that both the aspects of Chinese engagement in Africa and 
of a SEZ-strategy could provide for Ethiopia, the findings of this study offers little hope for 
the development success of the EIZ. Neither the overarching zone-strategy nor the 
cooperation between the Chinese and Ethiopian stakeholders are strong enough to provide the 
foundations needed in order for the EIZ to contribute to development and structural 
transformation. The overarching strategy has elements of problems concerning the type of 
enterprises that are in the zone, the amount of investment so far and the location, while the 
stakeholder cooperation is hindered by the lack of a coherent policy framework, lack of 
communication channels and unclear specification of responsibility. The study provides a 
number of policy implications to aid the prospects of the zone, but unless substantial 
improvements are made shortly, the development potential for the EIZ will be low. 
 The remainder of section 1 clarifies the significance of a study on the topic of 
Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa, as well as specifying the aim of the study and the research 
questions pursued in order to reach that aim. Section 2 accounts for the previous research on 
the four main topics within the research area: Chinese engagement in Africa, SEZs as a 
development tool, earlier (“non-Chinese”) SEZs in Africa, and previous research on the 
Eastern Industrial Zone. Having established the research frontier, section 3 outlines the 
theoretical framework on SEZs as a development tool with an unbalanced growth strategy and 
its connection to global value chains. The methodology of the EIZ case study is laid out in 
section 4, while section 5 offers the main contribution of the study by accounting for the 
analysis and discussion of that case study. The main findings are tied together and presented 
as conclusions and policy implications in the final section. 
1.1 Significance of the study 
There is substantial scope for this study to contribute to the current knowledge on Chinese 
engagement in Africa and specifically to the aspect of Chinese Special Economic Zones. A 
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study on this topic can make a significant contribution, as understanding how China’s 
engagement in Africa affects the continent is highly called for in the literature. Large (2008) 
highlights the need for a deeper theoretical understanding of Chinese engagement in Africa, 
Brautigam (2009) stresses the importance of understanding the workings of the SEZs as a 
development tool in Africa, and Geda and Meskel (2009) urge for more research on the 
effects of the Ethiopian EIZ. Using the EIZ as a case in point, this study will aim to contribute 
to the knowledge in these areas in order to contribute to the debate on both the increased 
Chinese development in Africa and on the potential for SEZs as development tools 
In addition to contributing the one aspect of Chinese engagement in Africa, the 
main scientific contribution of the study is provided by the new perspective of viewing SEZs 
as a possible strategy within a development process of unbalanced growth. The study 
connects the case of SEZs to Hirschman’s theory in a way that has not been done before, and 
in doing so opens up for a new understanding of the workings of SEZs.   
1.2 Aim and research questions 
The objective of the study is to fulfill the dual aim of shedding light on both Special 
Economic Zones as a development tool and on one aspect of Chinese engagement in Africa. 
In order to reach the aim of the study, two sets of overarching research questions have been 
developed. The study has been carried out as an inductive study, and the overarching research 
questions have evolved together with the process of specifying the theoretical framework and 
with the overall research progress. In order to carry out the study on the EIZ as a case in point 
among the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa, the following research questions have been 
pursued: 
 What are the prospects for the Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Zone to be a tool for 
development through aiding the process of structural transformation? Which criteria 
do those prospects hinge upon? 
 How does the aspect that the zone is Chinese-initiated affect its prospects to lead to 
development and structural transformation? Does the existence of multiple 
stakeholders of the Eastern Industrial Zone improve or impair its prospects for 
success? 
These two sets of research questions have guided the overall research process and set the 
overall frame of the study. The specific research questions and specific aspects that have been 
developed in order to carry out the analysis on the study are discussed in section 4, displaying 
the methodology of the study.  
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2 Previous research 
While research on the recent Chinese SEZs in Africa is scarce, literature on the two 
overarching subjects of Chinese engagement in Africa and of the effects of SEZs is 
widespread. In order to place the current study within these bodies of literature, the main 
debates within the topics are reviewed below, followed by an account of the research frontier 
concerning past SEZs in Africa and the previous research on the Ethiopian EIZ.    
2.1 Chinese engagement in Africa 
In the last decade the economic cooperation between China and Africa has increased 
dramatically as the flow of trade, aid and investments has witnessed an almost explosive 
growth. The China-Africa trade has increase to over $100 billion in 2010 (IMF 2011), and the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM, report that the Chinese FDI to Africa reached 
$2.1 billion in 2010 (MOFCOM 2009, 2010). Beyond the increased trade and aid, the 
increased engagement has expressed itself through a number of instruments, such as lines of 
credit to Chinese multinationals, exports credits, resource-backed loans, the China-Africa 
Development Fund as well as through the instrument of main focus for this study - the 
Chinese overseas special economic zones (Brautigam 2010). While historically scare, the 
research body on the China-Africa relationship is now growing, gaining momentum by the 
high-profile meeting of the 2006 FOCAC summit in Beijing (Large 2008). At present, the 
flora of views on the engagement is diverse. One strand of the literature has adopted a quite 
favorable view on the development, where the increase Chinese engagement is seen as win-
win situation of South-to-South partnership providing China with markets and Africa with 
investments (see e.g. Duarte 2012). Another strand instead call for caution concerning the 
increased relationship, as it may cause Africa to become less liberal (due to the Chinese 
practice of bribes), as China’s engagement is an extractive hunt for resources, as China 
“exports” weak labor standards, or as the increase engagement may crowded out African 
initiatives (Eisenman 2012, Marysse & Geenen 2009: 392, AFRODAD 2012).  
2.1.1 Chinese FDI in Africa 
Within the growing research body on the China-Africa relationship, the role of FDI has 
perhaps been awarded the greatest interest. Substantial efforts have been devoted to 
determining the underlying motivation for China to invest in Africa: is a quest for markets, 
resources or soft power? The argument that China’s interest in Africa is driven by a search for 
natural resources, as argued by e.g. Enuka (2010), is one of the most vocal arguments in the 
debate. However, this cannot fully explain the rapidly increasing Chinese interest, as it 
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includes both resource-rich and resource-poor countries. Brautigam and Tang (2011), argue 
that China’s interests is mainly driven by the quest for markets, possibly as a step of an 
internationalization of the developmental state, while also recognizing that soft power - a term 
coined by Nye (2004), may play a role. China’s emphasis on promotion of ‘political mutual 
trust’, friendship and cooperation, offers some support for the notion that soft power could be 
part of the driving force, which is eased by China’s ability to simultaneously portray itself as a 
fellow developing country and as an important role model (see e.g. FOCAC 2012:5). 
Currently there is no consensus as to the driver of China’s engagement in Africa, the 
discussion is moving away from simplistic assumptions that it is solely driven by resources. 
As Ethiopia is a relatively resource-poor country without oil- or mineral endowments beyond 
a modest supply of gold, the Chinese engagement in Ethiopia show that the interest is not 
solely driven by a question for resources. While no specific study has been carried out to 
identify the specific driver of Chinese FDI in Ethiopia, it plausible that the engagement in 
largely market-driven. Ethiopia has the third most populous country of Africa, and accessing 
this market would offer substantial possibilities for continued Chinese growth.    
2.1.2 FOCAC and the China-Africa Development Fund 
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC, can be identified as the backbone of Sino-
African relations. FOCAC was established at the Ministerial Conference in Beijing in 2000, 
with subsequent tri-annual meetings (Addis Ababa 2003, Beijing 2006, Sham el-Sheik 2009 
and Beijing 2012). The aim of FOCAC is to foster cooperation and long-term relations 
between the two parties, based on equality, mutual benefit and friendship (Enuka 2010). In 
addition to the overarching frame of cooperation set by the FOCAC, a number of additional 
channels for increased Chinese investments into Africa have been initiated by the Chinese 
government. Already in the 1980’s the Chinese government experimented with measures to 
encourage investment overseas, which was furthered by the bank reorganization in 1994, 
resulting in the creation of the China Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank, 
that now both play important roles in promoting Chinese trade and outward investment 
(Brautigam and Tang 2012a). This development has been followed by the creation of the 
China-Africa Development Fund, a development initiative tasked to promote Chinese 
investment in Africa for Africa development. Three of the seven Chinese SEZs in Africa are 
financed through this initiative, sending signals that the Chinese SEZs is Africa may be 
driven, at least partly, by African development objectives (Brautigam 2010). 
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The debate on the Sino-African cooperation channels in general, and specifically 
the FOCAC, is divided. Some research, most notably Chinese researchers, view the FOCAC 
as a tool for mutual benefit and cooperation. While to some extent recognizing that there 
could be room for improvements, especially concerning the level of equality between the 
parties, this body of literature view FOCAC as a political tool caring for the good of the 
public (see e.g. Meibo and Xie 2012, Ming 2012). The other side of the debate instead argues 
that the FOCAC is more similar to a spectacle where the Chinese government bestows gifts 
on Africa, rather than a serious platform based on development objectives (Taylor 2012). The 
FOCAC is in this sense only a rhetoric facade emphasizing mutual reciprocity, under which 
the unequal political and economic relationship between the parties still exists.  
Summing up the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa, one can conclude 
that the topic is hotly debated. While the research body is growing, more research is still 
needed. Little consensus can be found in any area of the matter so far, as the literature 
disagrees on whether the increased Chinese engagement provides important capital for Africa 
or crowd out African initiatives, if Chinese FDI is driven by resource extraction or provides a 
chance for Africa to join the global market and disagrees on the potential benefits of the 
FOCAC cooperation. As such, further research on the Chinese engagement in Africa is 
needed which the current study provides by its analysis of the Chinese-initiated SEZs in 
Africa. 
2.2 Special Economic Zones: A tool for development or for a “race to the bottom”  
Before exploring the debate of SEZs as tools for development, a short note on the history, 
definition and types of zones is provided.  
The usage of special zones for economic reasons has a long tradition, starting as 
early as 1704 in Gibraltar and 1819 in Singapore. These early zones were geared towards 
facilitating trade, while the first manufacturing-based zone was established in Spain in the 
1920’s. However, considering the design and aims of zones of today, the Shannon EPZ 
(Export Processing Zone) in Ireland, established in 1958, can be considered the “mother of 
zones”, as it became instrumental in spreading the knowledge about SEZs globally (FIAS 
2008, Aggarwal 2010 and Bolin 2004). The practice of SEZs have developed over time, and 
today a variety of different zone types with slightly different design and aims are 
implemented globally. These include Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones, Enterprise 
Zones, Free Ports, Single Factory Export Processing Zones and Specialized Zones (see FIAS 
2008 for a discussion of the features of the different zones types). In the current study the 
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term Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is used interchangeably to include all types of zones 
adhering to the basic definition of a geographically defined area that offer certain incentives 
for businesses that locate there. The area usually employ liberal and flexible policies in order 
to attract FDI, to promote non-traditional exports and to generate foreign exchange earnings, 
employment, income, and spillover benefits, including learning by locally owned firms (see 
e.g. World Bank 1992, UNCTC/ ILO 1988 and FIAS 2008). Within the general definitions of 
SEZs, a further distinction of three different types of zones can be identified: 1) Export 
focused enclave zones with little integration with the host economy 2) Zones as a testing-
ground for liberal policies and 3) Zones as a policy tool within a broader economic reform. 
The first type of zone were more common in the early days of modern SEZs, where the zone 
usually set up a as an export platform to attract foreign manufacturers seeking low-cost labor 
for the production of labor-intensive goods, e.g. clothes, toys and shoes (see Omar and 
Stoever 2008 for a discussion on this type of zone). Within this frame the zone does not 
develop a close integration with the host economy and there exists few cases where this type 
of zone has led to long term success. The most widely quoted example for the second 
identified zone type is China. In connection to China’s opening up process from 1978 
onwards, the SEZs was an integral part of the reform process, where the four first zones and 
subsequent 14 coastal areas served as a way for the Chinese government to “try out” a more 
liberal economic policy (Cheesman 2012). To many scholars, such as Wong and Chu (1984) 
and Brautigam (2010), the Chinese SEZs have played an important role in the Chinese rapid 
economic development, and it is highly probable that the Chinese SEZs’ success story - 
headed by the transformation Shenzhen from a fishing village to a metropolis of 14 million 
inhabitants - have played a large part in the popularity of the SEZs as a development tool for 
other developing countries. The last type of zone that can be identified is zones that have been 
implemented as a part of a larger economic reform program. The distinguishing factor 
between type 2 and 3 is that in the third case the zone strategy follow, rather than precede, 
economic reform. The Masan zone in South Korea can be seen as a successful example of this 
type, where the zone was implemented as a transition policy on the road towards a larger 
economic reform process (see e.g. Radelet 1999 and Kusago and Tzannatos 1998). The third 
type of zone has a larger focus on linkages between the zone economy and the overall 
domestic economy than the other types. As further discussed in the theoretical framework, 
linkages are perceive to play an important role in the potential success of a zone, and therefore 
the focus here is to distingue if the EIZ has the potential to  be a zone of the third type.  
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Having accounted for the history, definition and types of zones that can be 
identified from the literature the focus will now turn to establishing the knowledge frontier on 
SEZs. Despite 30 years of extensive research on the subject, there is no consensus on the 
workings of SEZs. The debate can broadly be categorized into two strands, one negative 
strand and one positive strand, which in turn can be categorized into two strands each, 
yielding the four strands of: the neoclassical argument, the argument of zones being a tool for 
a “race to the bottom”, the argument of zones being potential development tools and the 
argument that zones can have beneficial catalytic effects.  
 One of the earliest theories on the workings of SEZs draws on neoclassical 
theory and offer a generally negative view on zones a policy strategy. SEZs are in essence 
seen as a costly distortion strategy which distort trade, promote unfair competition between 
local and zone enterprises and is a production enclave of little economic contribution. 
Hamada (1974) provide the seminal work within this line of theory, concluding that SEZ 
benefits can at best equal foregone tax revenue and infrastructure expenditure and at worst 
hamper the host countries economic development. The argument boils down to that the final 
good price will be lower within the zone, due to the removal of tariff protection. This will lead 
to that the return to capital is higher in the protected domestic sector than in the zone, which 
will discourage FDI and, by extent, worsen the economic situation for the host economy. 
While later works within this line of theory has attempted to strengthen the argument by also 
considering the effect of intermediate - as opposed to only final - good tariffs as well (such as 
Miyagiwa and Young 1987), the core shortcoming of the neoclassical theory is that is limited 
to only consider a SEZ strategy as a second-best option. In certain aspects this logic is present 
also in more current literature, visible e.g. in Madani’s (1999) argument that a SEZ-strategy 
can only be useful as a second best, transition strategy on the road towards full liberalization. 
Recently, the neoclassical argument has lost ground within the debate on SEZs. This may 
partly be due to that the neoclassical platform has been forced to give way to other paradigms 
in the general economic debate, and to empirical success stories that do exist in relation to a 
SEZ strategy, but also to that the neoclassical argument offers a too static view of the 
potential of zones. In the past 30 years of modern SEZ-experience there appears to be a 
growing realization that a SEZ-strategy can be a dynamic tool to development and that it can 
potentially be more than a second-best option.  
 While the neoclassical view has become less present in the SEZ debate, another 
body of literature with a pessimistic approach to SEZs has grown, perhaps most vocally 
presented by Jauch (2002) and Jauch and Keet (1996). According to this line of theory SEZs 
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represent a liberalization policy tool that will spur a “race to the bottom” as countries compete 
for incoming FDI by providing the most generous incentives, the lowest labor cost and the 
lowest labor standards. Basing his argument on the experience of EPZs in Southern Africa in 
the 1990’s, Jauch (2002) argues that zone-policies spur costly and socially detrimental 
competition providing no economic benefits. Zimbabwe and Namibia agreed to suspend some 
of their labor laws in connection to the passing of EPZ laws in 1994 and 1995, and 
Mozambique and Malawi offered generous, and costly, incentives during their EPZ period 
during the 1990’s. The outcome of these measures has, according to Jauch, not been 
favorable. Instead of spurring economic development, the measures have had negative effects 
on working conditions as well as obstructing regional cooperation. The view that zones can 
induce a race to the bottom where countries scramble to provide the most attractive conditions 
for FDI at it is own expense, is further supported by two ICTFU reports (2003 and 2004). 
According to these reports SEZs are not a good development tool as they will only attract 
“footloose” investments, with few links to the local economy.  
The “race to the bottom”-argument has some merits, in that granting exemptions 
on minimum wage and labor rights in order to attract FDI will not spur a sustainable 
development process. However, based on extensive research on labor rights and wages in 
zones, it cannot be concluded that SEZs in general offer worse conditions than the outside 
zone economy. While there are examples of countries that have adopted more flexible labor 
codes in relation to SEZ policies (such as Zimbabwe and Namibia as discussed above, and 
Bangladesh as discussed by Cling et al 2005), this should according to most research on SEZ 
be considered as the exception rather than the norm (see e.g. Milberg and Amengual 2008, 
and Cheesman 2012). Also when it comes to wage levels, most research finds that zone wage 
is not worse than outside zone wage (see e.g. Kusago and Tzannatos 1998, Cling et al 2005 
and Jenkins 2005). In the Indian case Aggarwal (2007) find that zone wage may even be 
slightly higher than outside zone wage. As such, the current study will not specifically focus 
on wages and labor standards of the EIZ, but as further discussed in the theoretical framework 
the research will instead focus on the broader development objective of the EIZ to spur a 
dynamic domestic economy. 
  In contrast to the two above mentioned strands of literature with a pessimistic 
outlook on the effects of SEZs, one strand of literature argue that SEZs can be a tool for 
development. In essence, zones are seen as tools to attract FDI and its associated benefits of 
attracting capital, know-how and generating employment. To a large extent this line of theory 
is based on the success stories of China and Mauritius (see e.g. Cheesman 2012, Omar and 
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Stoever 2008). The possibility for SEZs to be an instrument for FDI and through that an 
instrument for development draws on elements of endogenous growth literature, 
developmental state literature and new institutional theory (Johansson 1994, Farole 2011: 46 
and Aggarwal 2010). Based on this, zones are seen as government initiatives to fill the gaps of 
domestic firms in areas such as technology, marketing, managerial know-how as well as 
international distribution channels. If this frame is extended by incorporating literature of 
global values chain, as suggested by Aggarwal (2010) and further explored in the theoretical 
framework of this study, SEZs can be more than a second-best option. From such an 
instrumental view on SEZs - the view of the current study - it becomes possible for a zone 
strategy to be a viable policy measure on its own right, beyond being a transitional policy on 
the road to liberalization.  
The last strand of previous literature that will be dealt with here is the literature 
discussing the catalytic potentials of SEZs.. The catalytic effects of a zone strategy are the 
indirect effects of the zone, beyond the immediate effects within the zone on e.g. exports or 
employment. The concept is founded in Romer’s (1993) notion of an “idea gap” in the 
developing world and was further developed by Johansson (1994) and Johansson and Nilsson 
(1997). Johansson (1994) first present the concept of catalytic effects, in an effort to depart 
from the neoclassical view on SEZs and explore how SEZs can have developmental effects, 
followed by Johansson and Nilsson’s (1997) attempt to develop a formal model for the 
catalytic contributions of SEZs using a gravity model. Based on the Malaysian experience in 
particular, the model shows the potential for SEZs to have catalytic effects on an economy by 
inducing a dynamic economy also outside the zone’s boundaries. The practice of recognizing 
the catalytic effects of zones have gained ground in the recent years, closely connected to the 
literature viewing SEZs as a tool for development (see e.g. Aggarwal 2007, 2010, Cheesman 
2012 and Litwack and Qian 1998). 
In sum, there exists no consensus in the theoretical debate on the workings of 
SEZs to date, despite decades of research. In order to contribute to the debate, the current 
study applies a new theoretical approach to the workings of SEZ, through viewing it is a 
strategy of unbalanced growth, which is clarified in the theoretical framework.  
2.3 African SEZs and Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa 
2.3.1 Africa’s previous SEZ experience 
An investigation of the previous SEZ-experience in Africa in general offers little hope for the 
success of the EIZ. From a global perspective the African SEZ experience is small, new and 
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generally a failure, as African zones only account of 4 % of the number of zones globally, 
have only been implemented since the 1990’s, and presents few success-cases (Farole 
2011:68). Jauch (2002), portray the African zone-experience of the 1990’s as an exercise of 
downward pressure on wages and labor standards failing to stimulate investments, Tekere 
(2000) argue that the only successful zone experience in Africa was that of Mauritius but only 
in the sense of the SEZ as a ‘second best policy’ rather than a dynamic development initiative. 
Furthermore, Cling et al (2005) argue that all African zones with the exception of the 
Madagascan failed to diversify exports and thus to spur development, and Farole’s (2011: 61) 
thorough comparison of six African zones and four in Asia/Latin America show that the 
African zones have neither spurred investment nor generated employment. Within the picture 
that most African SEZs have failed, Mauritius's zone experience stand out as one notable 
exception of success, as discussed by Auty (2011), Brautigam and Tang (2011), and Farole 
(2011:30), Tekere (2000) among others. Being a fellow resource-poor country, Mauritius’s 
SEZ experience offers hope for the Ethiopian EIZ. However, the success of Mauritius's zone-
strategy includes a number of context specific measures that may inhibit its replication. The 
Mauritian zone-strategy was by definition not a ‘zone’ as it was not bound by a 
geographically delimited area beyond the borders of the whole island. This is not the case of 
the EIZ in the large country of Ethiopia. Furthermore, Brautigam and Tang (2011) accounts 
for how the Mauritian government restricted local incentives from entering the zone, as it was 
assumed that these investors would invest in Mauritius anyway. Given the low investment 
capacity of the domestic initiatives in Ethiopia, the same assumption of that the zone-
investments would grow in tandem with local, non-zone investment cannot be made in 
Ethiopia. Lastly, (Auty 2011), highlight that part of the Mauritian success lies in the 
government’s large funding opportunities, collected from the successful sugar-sector, to 
manage and lead the zone-initiative. Despite the recent growth spurt in Ethiopia, such 
resources are not present in Ethiopia. The second successful zone-experienced mentioned in 
relation to African SEZ is the Magascarian SEZ. However, while Cling et al (2005) argue that 
the zone enabled diversification of exports and through that industrial upgrading, recent 
studies show that employment in the zone has collapsed, which substantially hinders its 
developmental effects (Farole 2011:69). Judging from the past experience of African SEZs, 
the potential for the EIZ appears to be quite limited. 
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2.3.2 The Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa 
In line with China’s “Going Global” strategy, the Chinese government announced the 
initiative of creating 50 overseas Special Economic Zones worldwide in 2006, which later 
was specified to include 3-5 zones in Africa. Currently, 19 zones have been implemented 
worldwide, six of which in Africa, in:  Ethiopia, Egypt, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia
2
 
(Brautigam and Tang 2012a). At the end of 2012, 140 enterprises had signed agreements to 
settle in the six zones (MOFCOM 2012). The zones are set up, development and invested in 
by Chinese enterprises, and enjoy the support of both the Chinese government in the local 
host government. The Chinese enterprise that is given the task to develop the zone is chosen 
by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM, through competitive tenders. So far, two 
tenders have been held in 2006 and 2007 respectively, were the Yonggang Group won the 
tender for the EIZ in 2007 (Brautigam and Tang 2011, 2012a). However, the EIZ experienced 
some challenges in the initial setup, possibly due to lack of finance in relation to the global 
financial crisis of 2008, and the lead developer was changed to be the Jiangsu Qiyuan Group 
(Qiyuan Group 2013).  
The Chinese-initiated SEZs form a unique development engagement in the 
global context, where the market-based decisions and investments made by the Chinese zone-
developers in a foreign context are combined with the support and subsidies from the strong, 
developmental Chinese state.  How successful can such an engagement be, and who will reap 
the benefits? The most extensive research on these Chinese-initiated African SEZs have been 
carried out by Brautigam (2010), who has attempted to specify the Chinese rationale for 
initiating the zones. The five strategic objectives of the zone are 1) to increase the demand for 
Chinese products, 2) to reduce trade frictions, 3) ease China’s domestic restructuring, 4) assist 
China’s enterprises to invest abroad by ‘going global’ in group and 5) to share China’s 
successful development process with Africa. The objectives appear to be mainly market-
driven, and could be seen as a way for China to enable its current structural transformation 
and “graduation” away from being an economy led by labor-intensive, low-tech production. 
In such case, the SEZs could prove to be useful for the African host countries too, even 
though the objectives are clearly Chinese-centered, as China’s upgrade along the value chain 
would free up space for the African country to join at the entry stage. In line with the 
theoretical framework of this study concerning the global value chains, the initiative has the 
potential to be beneficial for both parties  
                                                     
2
 Initially one zone was to be implemented in Algeria as well, but Algeria has chosen to exit the program.  
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2.3.3 The stakeholders of the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa 
An important distinction between the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa and the previous 
African SEZs is the number of stakeholders in the zone-initiative. While the previous zones 
mainly involved the national government, the current initiative involves the national 
government as well as the Chinese enterprise developing the zone and the Chinese 
government. Previous debate on stakeholders of zones have focused on the benefits of public 
or privately owned zones, where FIAS (2008) argue that privately-owned zone are more 
effective while Farole (2011: 125) states that there are no evidence that private zones would 
be better. However, due to the complex nature of the Chinese-initiated zones in Africa, little 
insight can be drawn from this debate. The largest shares of the Chinese-initiated zones are 
owned by the Chinese company that won the tender for the zone, which can be either a state-
owned enterprise or a private enterprise (Brautigam 2010). In most cases, the host government 
owns a share of the zones as well, but in the Ethiopian case the EIZ is 100 % privately owned 
(Farole 2011:197). While the role of the main developer is important, it is not the sole 
stakeholder, as both the Ethiopian government and the Chinese government has an interest in 
the success of the zone. The responsibility between the stakeholders have been divided so that 
the Chinese enterprise, with the support of the Chinese government, is responsible for the 
development within the zone, while the African host government is responsible for the 
development outside the zone to connect the zone to the local context. In addition to the 
divided responsibility between the Chinese developer, the Chinese government and the 
African government, the responsibility of the Chinese government to support the zone is 
further divided between the levels of government. As an example, the Qiyuan Group receives 
support from the central Chinese government, the provincial government and the municipal 
government, further increasing the number of stakeholders (Zhangjiagang Daily 2008). There 
is a risk that the multiple actors concerned with the development of the zone may impair the 
development of the zone, as the development focus becomes scatter and communication 
becomes more difficult. There might also be risk that the all the actor will have diverging 
views on their own and other actors’ responsibility, causing friction. This risk is especially 
prominent in the EIZ-case, as the zone lacks an overall policy document or statement of 
objectives, as will be further discussed in the analysis of the paper. 
 Despite extensive sourcing on the topic of the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa, 
it appears that very little is known about this innovative development strategy. Scattered 
information is provided by the Chinese MOFCOM, the Ethiopian MOFED, the lead developer 
Jiangsu Qiyuan group, the EIZ web page, news clippings and by the limited academic 
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literature on the subject, mainly conducted by Deborah Brautigam (2009, 2010, 2011 and 
Brautigam and Tang  2011, 2012a). However, no fully formed strategy of the zone exists. In 
the light of this, the current study is of crucial importance. Can these SEZs be the win-win 
tool of a successful investment opportunity for China and a development strategy for Africa 
that both parties hope for, or will one or more parties be suffer disappointing outcomes? 
Investigating the Ethiopian EIZ as a case in point, this study will attempt to answer this 
question.    
2.4 Ethiopia and the EIZ 
2.4.1 Chinese FDI in Ethiopia 
In line with the increased China-Africa cooperation, the cooperation between China and 
Ethiopia has increased in the last years. This has taken form the form of increased trade 
between the parties where China now is Ethiopia’s largest both export and import partner, 
through increased investment into infrastructure projects such as airports and the Addis Ababa 
ring road, and also so a small extent through Chinese investment into the Ethiopian 
agriculture sector (Geiger and Goh 2012, AFRODAD 2012 and Brautigam & Tang 2012b). 
Increased FDI has been a large part of the increased engagement, but the aspect should not be 
overemphasized. Placing the Chinese FDI into context, it accounted for 3.5% of the FDI into 
Ethiopia in 2009 (Geda & Meskel 2009). As Geiger and Goh (2012) show, most of this 
incoming FDI is in the manufacturing sector, which is in line with that Ethiopia is a quite 
resource poor country (Brautigam and Tang 2012a). The driving forces for the Chinese FDI 
includes to take advantage of the Chinese business networks that are already present in the 
country, to take advantage of the opportunity Ethiopia provides in terms of cheap labor, cheap 
land and an expanding market, as well as taking advantage of the cross-border investment 
incentives provided both by the Ethiopian and Chinese government (Geiger and Goh 2012b). 
As with the growing Chinese interest in Africa, the growing Chinese interest to invest in 
Ethiopia is not viewed favorably by all. As Adem (2012) notes, there are segments of the 
Ethiopian society - segments with vested interests - that are getting increasingly anxious in 
light of the sheer size of the bilateral relations between the parties. Geda and Meskel (2009) 
further notes that the increased Chinese FDI in the manufacturing sector could have potential 
negative impacts, as it can crowd out Ethiopian firms exporting labor-intensive manufactures 
by increasing the competition in the third market and displace them from the local market. 
However, Geiger and Goh’s (2012b) survey and study of Chinese FDI in Ethiopia show that 
there are positive impacts of the Chinese FDI in Ethiopia so far, especially concerning the 
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extent of good quality employment generation with relatively high wages and levels of on-
the-job training. However, if the same development pattern will be adopted by the EIZ as 
Geiger and Goh (2012b) identifies for the general situation of Chinese FDI in Ethiopia, two 
obstacles will potentially hinder the fruitful development of the EIZ. Firstly, most Chinese 
enterprises in Ethiopia has a high reliance on importing the intermediate input rather than 
sourcing it locally, which does not facilitate development in line with strong backwards 
linkages following e.g. the South Korean experience of the Masan zone with its extensive use 
of sub-contractors. Secondly, the low skill level of the Ethiopian labor force leads to that the 
Chinese firms chosen to fill the skill gap by employing Chinese labor at the skilled positions. 
This inhibits local learning, and if the same pattern is adopted by the firms in the EIZ, it will 
significantly lower the EIZ’s development potential. As can be seen from this study of 
Chinese FDI in Ethiopia, there is reason for both hope and caution about the development 
potential for the EIZ. 
2.4.2 The Eastern Industrial Zone 
The Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Park is located 30 kilometers south of Addis Ababa. The 
original plans established at the 2007 MOFCOM-tender included plans of a 5 square 
kilometer zone of a $146 million investment operated by the Yonggang Group and the Qiyuan 
Group, that would attract 80 investment projects in five years and create up to 20 000 jobs for 
Ethiopians (Brautigam 2011, Geda & Meskel 2009). However, during the implementation 
stage the plans have been changed: the EIZ has been shrunken to a target of 2 square 
kilometers and a $101 million USD investment, and the Yonggang Group has left the project. 
The startup of the zone was delayed as the first firm moved in 2010, and currently the zone 
hosts 12 firms, far below its target. In the literature about the zone, it is difficult to discern 
what the focus of the zone is aimed to be. Brautigam (2011) state that the focus on the EIZ is 
on steel production, while Geiger and Goh (2012b) states that the focus is on textile, apparel 
and agricultural products, which is in line with Geda and Meskel’s (2009) view of the zone 
focus. As will be evident by the analysis chapter, the zone focus at this point is difficult to 
pinpoint, as the few firms that are in the one represent a diverse flora of sectors. In line with 
the theoretical framework of the study, it would be more conducive if the firms had a focus 
more similar to that of Geiger and Goh (2012b) than Brautigam (2011)  no such clear focus 
can be discerned.  
The previous literature on the EIZ provides an insight into its initial challenges. 
Geiger and Goh (2012b) lift that the lack of funding has been a problem during the first phase, 
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due to high costs of the infrastructure development and the limited sources of revenue. 
Brautigam (2011) addresses the problems caused by the change of shareholders and decreased 
investment target. One possible cause could be the international timing of the investment - 
due to the global financial crisis at the time - but the initial challenges may also be due to the 
limited experience both the Yonggang Group and the Qiyuan group had of investing in 
Ethiopia before they won the tender. According to Brautigam (2011), most enterprises that 
won the tenders for the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa had previous experience in the 
context, but the Yonggang Group appears to have had no experience, and the Qiyuan Group 
made their first investment into Ethiopia only one before winning the tender (Brautigam 2011, 
Qiyuan group 2013). 
To understand the Ethiopian context is not only important for the Qiyuan Group 
to make fruitful investment decision, it is also crucial in order to understand the role the EIZ 
can play in the country. In the last decade Ethiopia has experience rapid economic growth, 
averaging over 10% annually. If the EIZ can be a tool to transform this rapid growth into 
sustainable development and increase the low GDP per capital of $513, the development 
potential of the EIZ in Ethiopia is high.  Ethiopia has the potential for development due to its 
stable macroeconomic environment, the management of the previously high inflation rate, its 
large labor force and ample access to resources such as cotton, wood and cattle (Geiger and 
Goh 2012a, Dihn et al 2012, GTP 2010, WDI 2013). To explore how the EIZ takes advantage 
of the opportunities that the context of Ethiopia offer forms an important part of the analysis. 
Can the EIZ be a tool to transform the recent economic growth into structural transformation 
and development in Ethiopia? In order to answer this question, a thorough theoretical frame 
for how a SEZ can be a tool for development is needed, so that the question if the EIZ can be 
such a tool can be addressed.  
3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Development as structural change 
The theoretical framework of the study has been designed in order to explore the research aim 
of establishing the prospects for SEZs to be tools for development, in order to explore the 
prospects for the Eastern Industrial Zone to lead to Ethiopian development. In the study, the 
concept of development is understood as a dynamic process leading to structural change in a 
society, and the theoretical framework is therefore focused on establishing the mechanism 
through which SEZs, and the EIZ, can to lead to such a structural change. The literature on 
structural change is widespread, and among the classic works are e.g. Fisher’s (1939) and 
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Clark’s (1940) theory concerning the development of a tertiary service sector, Lewis’s (1954) 
model of a dual economy and Chenery and Syrquian’s (1975) statistical exploration of the 
structural processes that accompany economic development across different stages of 
development. In the current study, Chenery and Syrquin’s (1975) definition of structural 
change will be applied and structural change will as such be viewed as the changes in 
economic composition, output and employment that lead to sustainable development and 
increases in living standard. The main role of the theoretical framework is to establish through 
which channels SEZs and the EIZ can lead to structural change. The foundation for this is to a 
large extent drawn from the concept of “unbalanced growth”, as popularized by Albert 
Hirschman (1958). From this foundation the theoretical framework is extend by drawing on 
literature on global value chains, in order to make Hirschman's theory on unbalanced growth 
applicable to the context of SEZs in today’s globalized world. 
3.2 Structural change through unbalanced growth 
In 1958 Albert Hirschman presented his theory of unbalanced growth - a critique to the theory 
that a balanced growth strategy is the most suitable development strategy for developing 
countries. According to Hirschman (1958: 66) the task of development strategy should be to 
encourage - rather than eliminate - unbalance in profits and investments, as it is these 
imbalances that enable to economy to grow. Hirschman does not believe it feasible for all 
sectors of the economy to be encouraged simultaneously, especially not in a resource scarce 
developing country, and the development strategy should instead target certain sectors. The 
targeted sectors then become the leading sectors of the economy, and development occurs as 
growth is communicated from the leading sectors to the followers, from one industry to 
another, from one firm to another (Hirschman 1958: 62-63). The notion of promoting ‘leading 
sectors’ share the basic logic of a SEZ-strategy, in the sense that a zone-strategy give special 
emphasis to the zone over the rest of the economy. In the current study the EIZ is therefore 
viewed as a strategy of unbalanced growth, in line with Hirschman’s argument. Hirschman 
further specifies two distinct measures of inducing an unbalanced growth strategy: through 
investment in Social Overhead Capital, SOC, (investments in all basic services that enable 
production in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors) or through investment in Directly 
Productive Activities, DPA (Hirschman 1958: 83-97). Hirschman argues that both present 
valid options as development strategies, but the current study will only consider the strategy 
of investments in SOC. While partly due to the unconvincing argumentation in favor of 
investments in DPA, where Hirschman fails to assign adequate importance to the limitations 
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that a lack of SOC would imply for DPA investments, this mainly origins from that the EIZ 
should be viewed as a SOC, rather than a DPA, investment. The EIZ performs like 
Hirschman’s envisions investments into SOC to perform, in the way it supports investments 
into DPA by providing important facilities.  
3.2.1 The importance of linkages 
In order for growth to be communicated from one sector to another, there needs to be strong 
forward and backward linkages between sectors. Forward linkages encourage investment in 
subsequent stages of production while backward linkages encourage investment in earlier 
stages of production. Key here is the word encourage, as linkages in the Hirschmanian sense 
go beyond interdependence and inserts a causal relationship between the sectors. Hirschman 
(1958: 116) further argues that backward linkages are more important than forward linkages, 
as sectors with strong backward linkages automatically create a demand for input in a sense 
that forward linkages do not (e.g. investment into the leather product sector will increase the 
demand for cattle, but investment into cattle will not directly increase the demand for leather 
products). As most SEZs focus on exports, Hirschman’s emphasis on backward linkages will 
be retained in the study, and the analysis will to a large extent focus on the level of integration 
of the EIZ through its backward linkages. 
3.2.2 Extending the Hirschmanian frame 
While Hirschman to a large extent present a fully formulated theory of a development strategy 
based on unbalanced growth, certain aspects are not covered within this frame. The 
unbalanced growth strategy pays little attention to the development of agriculture, beyond 
stating that it is a low-productive sector of few linkages. Given the importance that 
agricultural productivity increase has played in the structural transformation and transition out 
of poverty for almost all economies (city-states like Hong Kong and Singapore being 
exceptions), this is aspects in unsatisfactory addressed (Timmer 2005). However, in the 
Ethiopian context the role of agriculture is promoted in all major policy documents, including 
the three overarching development plans in place since 2002 (SBPRP 2002, PASDEP 2005, 
GTP 2010). As such, the strategy of unbalanced growth can be applied in addition to this 
focus, so that the agricultural development is not neglected. The main drawback of the 
theoretical framework so far in this study is instead the lack of direction as to the “degree” of 
unbalance. Hirschman (1958: 79) attempts to address this issue, but little guidance can be 
drawn as to how to specifically implement the unbalanced strategy. In order to link 
Hirschman’s strategy closer to the implementation of SEZs and to more clearly specify how 
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SEZs can be a tool for development through inducing structural change through unbalanced 
growth, Hirschman’s (1958: 111-113) discussion of setting up “last industries first” will be 
coupled with literature promoting light manufacturing as a conducive starting point for 
development and industrialization, and with literature on global value chains. 
3.3 Unbalanced growth through promotion of “last stage industries” 
In line with the focus on backward linkages, Hirschman (1958:117-119) argues that the most 
conducive way to induce unbalanced growth is to place focus on the “last stage industry” first. 
Last stage industries create stimulating backward linkages and are also relatively easy to set 
up as the input initially can be imported, if it is not available domestically. As the demand for 
the intermediate input grow in the local market, the incentive of supplying the input locally 
will increase, which will spur a dynamic economic development. In relation to the Ethiopian 
context, the World Bank publication “Light manufacturing in Africa” (Dihn et al 2012) argue 
for a development strategy similar to that of last industries first, as it sets out to show how 
Ethiopia could benefit from an increased focus on light manufacturing. Much like the strategy 
of last industries first, light manufacturing is perceived as a sector that can be induced with 
relative ease to then facilitate the processes of structural transformation through the 
dynamisms that the sector’s externalities create. The focused approach of encouraging 
specifically light manufacturing is justified on grounds similar to that of Hirschman, as 
“developing countries cannot afford to wait until all of the problems across sectors are 
resolved” but need a more focused approach (Dihn et al 2012: 47). Addressing Ethiopia 
specifically, the report lifts that Ethiopia has good prospects to embark on a development 
strategy of light manufacturing due to its natural resources (e.g. wood, cotton and cattle), 
large labor pool (Ethiopia is the third most populous country in Africa) and recent high 
growth rate. In the analysis of the current study the aim will be to investigate the prospects for 
the EIZ to encourage last stage industries in the form of light manufacturing, in line with 
Hirschman’s (1958) and Dihn et al (2012) arguments that this could facilitate a structural 
transformation in Ethiopia. However, a crucial aspect for this line of theory to hold is that the 
backward linkages from the last stage industries/light manufacturing in fact lead to a higher 
domestic demand for intermediate goods, rather than increased import of intermediate goods. 
The analysis of the study will therefore concern itself both with the type of industries that the 
EIZ host (if the firm in the zone belong to the category of light manufacturing as a last stage 
industry), but also how these firms fit into the Ethiopian context. Is it possible to supply the 
needed intermediate inputs in Ethiopia, and/or does Ethiopia have a comparative advantage in 
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producing those products? If the increased demand for intermediate input is supplied by 
imports rather than creating a domestic demand and to stimulate the domestic market for the 
input, the EIZ will risk becoming an enclave zone with few links and effects on the Ethiopian 
development. 
3.4 Unbalanced growth and the global value chain 
In an effort to tie Hirschman’s framework of unbalanced growth to today’s globalized world, 
the theoretical framework has been supplemented by an additional focus of how the EIZ can 
facilitate Ethiopia’s insertion into the global value chain. As the world has become 
increasingly globalized, the possibility of producing goods in multiple stages, where each 
stage is carried out at the most (cost-) efficient location has increased dramatically (Aggarwal 
2010). Through this, global value chains have developed. Being integrated into the global 
value chain can offer an important development opportunity for a country. Dihn et al (2012) 
lifts the importance for an economy to elevate its position on the global market in order to 
develop and Aggarwal (2010) view entry into the global value chain as a way to strengthen 
the competitiveness of local firms and increase their capabilities. Incoming FDI can greatly 
facilitate a country's insertion in the global value chain as FDI enables access to new 
technologies, skills and capital. As a SEZ can facilitate the attraction of FDI by creating an 
enabling business environment, a SEZ has the potential to enable the insertion into the global 
value chain. Exploring various types of FDI, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) find that 
manufacturing FDI is the most desirable form of FDI as it generates a high level of 
employment which facilitates productivity-enhancing structural change. At the current 
moment there is substantial scope for an increased manufacturing sector in Ethiopia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, as the light manufacturing from the region accounts for less than 1% of the 
global production (Dihn et al 2012). While this low number may appear to discourage 
investments into sectors within the focus of light manufacturing as a last stage industry, the 
current global environment offer opportunities for growth in the area. Currently China 
accounts for the lion share of low-skilled manufacturing jobs globally, but as China is moving 
up the global value chain the global composition of these jobs will change. Lin (2011) 
estimates that China’s transition will free up almost 100 million manufacturing jobs - more 
than double of the manufacturing jobs in developing countries today. In this sense China’s 
engagement in Africa through the SEZs is offering the double opportunity of both benefiting 
from China’s direct investment and from its indirect effect of increased employment 
opportunities.     
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 An important aspect when connecting the theory of unbalanced growth to the 
more modern concept of global value chains is that this shifts the focus from inter-sector 
linkages to inter-firm linkages. The unbalanced growth theory concerns itself with the 
linkages between sectors, but when FDI enter the picture this focus is altered as FDI embodies 
investments into a specific firm rather than to a sector as a whole. As such, the linkages 
between firms on different stages of the production become more important, e.g. through the 
use of sub-contractors. The current study will attempt to consider both the inter-sectoral 
linkages and the inter-firm linkages. The overall focus is how the EIZ - viewed as a sector - 
spur unbalanced growth with the “local economy-sector” in Ethiopia. However, in order to 
make this focus researchable it is supplemented by a focus on potential inter-firm linkages 
that each specific enterprise in the EIZ may develop with local firms. As a sector in essence is 
build up by a number of firms this approach is justified and will enable the study to research 
the potential for inter-sectoral linkages through analysis of the potential for inter-firm 
linkages. 
3.4.1 The integration of SEZs with the local economy 
In the literature concerning SEZs, the focus often lies on exploring how well the zone 
interacts with the international economy. Through measures such as cost-benefits analysis
3
 or 
analysis based of neo-classical theory this type of literature emphasis that the role of a SEZ is 
to interact with the international economy in order to gain e.g. foreign exchange and tax 
revenue from international companies. Within the theoretical framework of this study, based 
on the concepts of unbalanced growth and global value chains, the focus instead shifts from 
the SEZ’s interaction with the international economy to the SEZ’s interaction with the 
domestic economy. Within this frame, the SEZs’ “major contribution lies in getting the 
domestic firms inserted into global supply-production-distribution networks” to use the words 
of Aggarwal (2010:54), exploring the role of SEZs in the Indian context. The notion of 
shifting the emphasis from the interaction with the international economy to the interaction 
with the domestic economy is comparable to Johansson’s (1994) and Johansson and Nilsson’s 
(1997) concept as ‘catalytic effect’, as discussed above. It is the view of this study that the 
catalytic effect – broadly defined as the mesh of secondary effects  that a SEZ can have - is 
the key to a successful SEZ experience, and that the stronger the linkages there are between 
the zone economy and the local economy, the more potential the zone has to have such 
                                                     
3
 A crude measure of SEZs success where zone benefits such as foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue is 
compared  to zone costs such as subsidies, administration costs and infrastructure expenditure (see e.g. Warr 
1989 and Jayanthakumaran 2003). 
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secondary effects. Through the secondary effects stimulating the domestic host economy,  the 
zone has the potential to facilitate the insertion of the host economy into the global value 
chain, spurring an unbalanced growth process between the zone economy and the local 
economy, which will lead to structural transformation and development. 
However, one note of caution is needed to the above appraisal of the 
development potential of joining the global value chain. The potential benefit of the global 
value chain lies in that if offers the opportunity for industrial upgrading along the chain, 
increasing the development effects of being part of the global production-supply network. 
Taking the highly successful development process of East Asia as an example, the key to this 
success was not only to enter the value chain at the first level of labor intensive, low-tech 
production but that this entry enabled the countries of the region to elevate its position from 
the entry-level of assembly to increasingly expand the local production and sourcing, the 
domestic design and eventually the domestic branding of production (Gereffi 1999). From the 
opposite perspective, the development experience of the Dominican Republic serves as an 
example that while a SEZ may be helpful for entering the global value chain, it does not 
automatically facilitate industrial upgrading. During the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the SEZs 
experience of the Dominican Republic was often cited as a success case (e.g. Johansson 1994, 
Johansson and Nilsson 1997), as it facilitated the country’s transition from an agricultural 
dominated economy to a manufacturing-led economy. However, it appears now that the 
country “got stuck” on the first level of the global value chain, due to an over-reliance of 
preferential trade agreements and tax exemptions, and too little focus on structural change 
(Burgaud and Farole 2011). In order to avoid such an over-reliance of low taxes and, by 
extent, failure of the Chinese-initiated zones, these new SEZs in Africa need to be integrated 
into larger development initiative in the country. Through that, the benefits of entering into 
the global value chain through a SEZs policy can be reaped, leading the country onto a path of 
industrial upgrading and structural transformation.  Despite the risk that the development of 
the Dominican Republic represents, the focus of this study on the SEZs potential to facilitate 
entry into the global value chain, rather than upgrading along it. While entering into the global 
value chain is not a sufficient condition for development in its own right it is here viewed as 
an important component within an unbalanced growth strategy.   
3.5 The criteria of SEZ-success 
The theoretical frame specified above is used as measure to translate the general importance 
of SEZ-linkages – now popular to emphasis by most SEZ researchers (see e.g. as Omar and 
23 
 
Stoever 2007, Farole 2011, Cheesman 2012, and Milberg  and Amengual 2008) – into 
researchable criteria for SEZ-success. This has been done by viewing the SEZs as a promoted 
sector within an unbalanced growth strategy, where the main links between the EIZ and the 
local economy is through backward linkages. In order to theoretically explain which 
sectors/firms have the potential to create such conducive linkages, the frame rests of the logic 
provided by the notion of “last industries first”, which itself is extended and modernized 
through the focus of light manufacturing. The focus on light manufacturing opens up for the 
discussion of global value chains, as light manufacturing can be an important first step to join 
this chain, which in itself provides a promising road towards development, based on the 
successful East Asian experience. As such, the EIZ will be successful if it is a dynamic 
economic zone with backward linkages, in line with Hirschman’s logic of unbalanced growth. 
The potential for the EIZ to become a dynamic zone is strongest if the zone focuses on light 
manufacturing, in general based on Hirschman’s argument for promotion of last stage 
industry's first, and specifically for the Ethiopian case based on the World Bank publication 
“Light manufacturing in Africa” (Dihn et al 2012), which lift the potential for Ethiopia to 
embark on a development process through light manufacturing. If the EIZ focus on this, it has 
the potential to spur a development process and structural change, in the way it will provide 
Ethiopia an opportunity to join the global value chain. The prospect for the EIZ to be a 
development tool as such hinges on four criteria: 
 
 The zone needs to be economically dynamic, so that the growth between the promoted 
sector and the other sectors is actually unbalanced.  
 There needs to be linkages between the zone and the local economy, so that economic 
dynamism spread to the local economy.  
 The dynamisms spurred in the local economy should enable the domestic firms to 
become part of the global value chain, to further facilitate the process of structural 
transformation. 
 In the special case of the Chinese-initiated EIZ, success also hinge upon the nature of 
the cooperation between three stakeholders in the zone process (the Ethiopian 
government, the Chinese government and the Chinese enterprises). 
 
If the above four criteria are fulfilled, the EIZ has good prospects to be a development tool for 
Ethiopia and facilitate a structural change in the country. The study researches the 
possibilities for these criteria to be fulfilled through analysis of the policy framework, the 
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firms currently in the EIZ and the macroeconomic climate in Ethiopia. The specific measures 
of the analysis are displayed in the following methodology chapter. 
4. Methodology 
In order to pursue the research aim of the study, an inductive, qualitative case study approach 
has been applied. Being a flexible and inclusive method, this method has served the aim of the 
study well, given the scattered and scarce nature of the data on the Chinese-initiated SEZs in 
Africa. In light of the relative recentness of these zones - the announcement of their creation 
first being made in 2006 and the implementation of the EIZ being delayed until 2010 - a 
causal study is not possible yet. At the current time it would be close to impossible to discern 
which development progress in Ethiopia could be derived from the creation of the EIZ and the 
general development progress of the country. Therefore, traditional methods to measure 
development through structural change such as analyzing changes in sectoral composition or 
in diversification of exports cannot be applied in a fruitful way. Rather than such a causal 
study, the study has been conducted as an explorative study of the initial phase of the EIZ, 
including analysis of its design and implementation, initial progress/challenges and of the 
context the EIZ is implemented into. In order to apply this method, the study relies heavily on 
the specified theoretical framework to explore the criteria for success set out there. The close 
connection between the theoretical foundation and analysis of the study was made possible 
through the inductive nature of the study. The theoretical frame, the research focus and the 
analysis of the study has co-evolved throughout the research process, enabling the research to 
move forward. Given the limited available information of the specific research interests of the 
EIZ, this has been a necessary technique. The main method of the study has been to explore 
the four criteria set out in the theoretical framework, through the following researchable 
questions: 
 
 Criterion 1: “The zone needs to be economically dynamic, so that the growth between 
the promoted sector and the other sectors is actually unbalanced.”  
o How much investment and capital is flowing into the zone? How many 
companies are in the zone and of what size? Is the location of the zone 
conducive for a dynamic economy? 
 Criterion 2: “There needs to be linkages between the zone and the local economy, so 
that economic dynamism spread to the local economy.” 
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o What type industries/sectors do the firms in the zone represent? What type of 
linkages (backwards or forwards) can these firms provide, and to what extent? 
If there are linkages, do these fit with the Ethiopian context, e.g. can Ethiopian 
provide the input that the backward linkages demand? 
 Criterion 3: “The dynamism spurred in the local economy should enable the domestic 
firms to become part of the global value chain.” 
o What is the level of labor-intensity of the firms in the zone, and the level of 
technology? Is the EIZ a conducive trade facilitator in terms of the 
infrastructure it provides? 
 Criterion 4: “In the special case of the Chinese-initiated EIZ, success hinge upon the 
nature of the nature of the cooperation between three stakeholders in the zone process 
(the Ethiopian government, the Chinese government and the Chinese enterprises)”.  
o What are the channels for cooperation and communication between the 
stakeholders? What is the division of responsibility and how is that carried 
out? 
 
The main method of pursuing these research aspects have been to explore the policy 
framework surrounding the zone, including policy from both the Ethiopian and the Chinese 
government, the type of firms currently operating in the EIZ and the context the zone is being 
implemented into. Based on these overarching methods four areas of data to analyze was 
specified: 1) the EIZ policy frame, 2) the initial phase of the EIZ, 3) the China-Ethiopia 
cooperation and 4) the Ethiopian economic context. The content of the four data-areas and  
the specific methods applied within each area is further accounted for below. 
4.1 Strength of used method 
Even though the EIZ has only been in progress for a short period of time, there is substantial 
scope for a study of this type to be carried out at this point of its development. A study of the 
early phase of the EIZ process has the potential to reveal areas of possible improvements and 
offer policy guidance that can aid the future development of the zone. Furthermore, the 
potential to be able to draw meaningful conclusions on the SEZ-strategy at this point is large, 
in line with the findings from the FIAS-report: “To a great extent, zone initiatives determine 
their own destiny from the start, with the establishment of policy frameworks, incentive 
packages, and various other provisions and bureaucratic procedures“ (FIAS 2008: 48). 
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Applying a qualitative method to explore the potential benefits of the zone 
strategy is well in line with the current literature on zones, as e.g. Omar and Stoever (2008), 
Aggarwal (2010) and Jenkins (2005) all lift that the potential development effects from SEZs 
should be addressed from a nuanced perspective, covering aspects beyond static contributions 
to foreign exchange, investments and employment. It is the level of integration of the SEZ and 
the host economy that determines its success, and in order to analyze this at this point for the 
EIZ, a qualitative case study design is needed. Aggarwal (2010) lifts that overemphasis on 
employment generation and investment levels are common in SEZ analysis, and the current 
study is an attempt to avoid this and incorporate important, non-quantifiable objectives of a 
SEZ-strategy. As Baissac (2003) discusses, the SEZ contribution to employment and/or 
exports does not set the standard for the potential SEZ-benefits. Instead the focus of this study 
and its methodology will be to address the role of SEZs to create a dynamic economy through 
stimulating structural change of the economic composition. Much like the successful zones of 
e.g. South Korea and Taiwan the main channel for the EIZ to do this is to enable Ethiopia to 
achieve sustainable development through encouraging diversification of the economy into 
high-value-added manufactured goods, through entry into global value chain (Rhee and Balot 
1990, Haywood 2000).  
The method of exploring the surrounding economic climate in Ethiopia is 
crucial to the analysis. Milberg and Amengual (2008) highlight that explaining why some 
countries succeed with SEZ-strategies while others do not requires analysis of condition 
beyond the zone itself, while Mandani (1999) argue that zones are sensitive to the national 
economic environment, which is supported by Romer’s (1993) and Alter’s (1991) findings 
that zone perform better in a sound macroeconomic climate with a sound exchange rate policy 
frame. As such, the potential contribution of a qualitative study incorporating the overall 
Ethiopian climate at this early point of the EIZ is large, and the methodology suitable for the 
research aim. 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 The EIZ policy frame 
In order to analyze the EIZ policy frame, numerous policy documents were sourced and 
analyzed. These include the three overarching development plans that the Ethiopian 
government have been working according to since 2002: the Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) 2002/03-2004/05, the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty 2005/06-2009/10 and the Growth and Transformation 
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Plan 2010/11-2014/15, as well as the specific Ethiopian policies that can have an impact of 
the EIZ, mainly those relating to investments, export strategies and labor standards: the 
Investment Proclamation 280/2002, the Investment Regulation 84/2003 and its amendment 
146/2008, the Investment Regulation 270/2012, Investment Proclamation 769/2012 and the 
Labor Proclamation 377/2003. Supplementary data on the EIZ frame was also sourced from 
documents from the five FOCAC summits, in order to gain a fuller picture of the EIZ policy 
frame. 
4.2.2 The initial phase of the EIZ 
The EIZ was first initiated in 2007 and have been in operation since 2010, meaning that it was 
possible to source some data on the EIZ development so far. The main bulk of the data was 
provided by the EIZ webpage and the Qiyuan webpage. All news entries from both web pages 
have been included in the analysis, and this was supplemented by analysis of an interview 
with Mr Shuaiji Wu, management member of the EIZ, as reported by the Ethiopian Herald 
(The Ethiopian Herald 2012). However, the main analysis on the initial phase of the EIZ has 
concerned itself with analysis of the list of current enterprises in the zone, compiled from 
various sources such as the EIZ and Qiyuan web pages but also the data availability from the 
Ethiopian Investment Agency and e-mail contact with the Qiyuan group.  
4.2.3 The China-Ethiopia cooperation 
Aided by the extensive work of IISD (Bernasconi-Osterwalder 2012) of compiling and 
translating China’s policies on Outward Direct Investments, the data for this section include 
the Chinese policies of outward FDI, to enable analysis of the development of Chinese-
initiated SEZ both the relation to China’s “Going Global” policy and in relation to the 
growing China-Africa engagement. This has also been supplemented by analysis of the 
declarations and action plans for China-Africa engagement produced by the five FOCAC 
summits.  
4.2.4 The context of Ethiopia 
Data on the economic climate of Ethiopia is the most readily available data concerning the 
data needed for the current study. A number of World Bank publication has been used such as 
the “Ethiopian Economic Update” (Geiger and Goh 2012a), “Chinese FDI in Ethiopia” 
(Geiger and Goh 2012b), and the “Ethiopia Country Profile” (World Bank 2011), as well as 
the World Development Indicators (WDI 2013), data provided by the IMF on investment and 
trade levels, and annual reports from Ethiopia's Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, MOFED.  
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Together the four areas of data have enabled the analysis of the study and laid 
the foundation for answering the research questions of the study. 
5 Analysis 
The analysis chapter is divided according to the four areas of data, in order to best illuminate 
each data sections’ relevance to the two main research questions. The analysis of each 
separate section is followed by a discussion concerning the four criteria that EIZ success 
hinges upon. 
5.1 The EIZ policy frame 
5.1.1 The EIZ policy frame 
In researching the EIZ policy frame, the most important finding is the lack of a policy frame 
to research. During the first six years of the EIZ it appears to have operated in a policy-
vacuum, where no Ethiopian law, policy or organ was specifically designated to govern its 
existence. There have been some improvements since 2012, as industrial zones have been 
included into the country’s investment proclamation, but the lack of clear policy direction 
from the Ethiopian government remains troublesome (Regulation no 769/2012).  
Prior to 2012 no legal body was governing the implementation of the EIZ, apart 
from a short note in Ethiopia Industrial Development Strategy of 2002, stating that industrial 
zones of high-level infrastructure should be created to speed up allocation of land for 
investment. However, no mention is made on how this is to benefit the Ethiopian economy, or 
how this creation should be pursued (MOTI 2002). None of the policies governing the Ethiopian 
investment climate during EIZ’s implementation mention industrial zones (Regulation 280/2002, 
Regulation 289/2002, Regulation 84/2003), nor does the amendment to the investment incentives 
of 2008, which was implemented during the startup of the EIZ (Regulation 146/2008).  The 
inclusion of section 8 in the no 769/2012 Investment Proclamation was the first mention of a zone 
strategy, as Article 33.1 specifies the industrial development zones shall be established in order 
for the industrial sector to have a leading role in the economy (Regulation no 769/2012). This 
statement of the Ethiopian policy frame presents a good fit with the EIZ as a strategy of 
unbalanced growth, but Article 33.2 may suggest that the Ethiopian government are not satisfied 
with the current situation of its industrial zones, which to a large extent means the EIZ (as the EIZ 
is Ethiopian first and largest zone). The article states that the federal government should run all 
zones and only “when deemed necessary” should joint investments or the private sector be 
tolerated. This could suggest that the Ethiopian government is unsatisfied with the current 
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development of zones in the country, as it expresses a wish to move away from the joint 
cooperation that the EIZ represents. The 2012 Investment Proclamation is the overarching 
policy governing the EIZ from the Ethiopian government, and the most important feature of 
the proclamation in relation to the policy frame for the EIZ is the statement that a specific bill 
to govern the administration of Ethiopia’s industrial zones will be created, as well as a special 
organ established to oversee that zones’ development (Regulation 769/2012, article 34-35). 
New clippings report that a draft of the bill has been drawn, but no bill has been passed by the 
Ethiopian government yet (Mesfin 2012, EIZ 2013:19). Similar to this study’s interpretation 
of the statement in the Investment Proclamation that the Ethiopian government wish to play a 
larger role in the creation of industrial zones in the country, the media speculate that this bill 
can indicate an acknowledgement among the government that the Chinese-initiated SEZs, in 
its present form and function, do not bring significant return to Ethiopia. The following 
remark on the new bill by Melaku Taye, head of communications at the Ethiopian MOFED, 
support this notion: “It was decided that the development [of industrial zones] should be 
solely left to the government, [as] the government is in a better position to provide the 
amenities required rather than the private sector" (Mesfin 2012). As there is substantial room 
for the Ethiopian government to expand its current role and stake in the EIZ, this recent 
progress to do so is promising. However, these initiatives to gain more say in the development 
process of the EIZ are being taken six years after the Qiyuan Group won the tender to develop 
the zone. While the initiatives indicate progress, the lack of a policy frame may already have 
hampered the EIZ’s possibilities to be tool for development in Ethiopia. 
The problems caused by the EIZ operating in a vacuum among Ethiopia’s laws 
and regulations on investment, trade, infrastructure and labor standards could have been aided 
if the role of the EIZ was governed by guidelines, goals or agreements developed by one or 
more of the stakeholders (the Ethiopian government, the Chinese government or the Qiyuan 
group). However, no such guidelines, goals or agreements can be found, despite extensive 
sourcing from the EIZ management and the Qiyuan Group, the Ethiopian EIA, MOFED and 
the Export Promotion Agency, the Chinese MOFCOM, Embassy in Ethiopia and the 
Economic and Commercial Counsel (to where the author was referred to by MOFCOM to 
find more information on the policies guiding the EIZ), the bilateral agreements between the 
countries as well as all FOCAC documentation and Chinese policies on outward FDI. Apart 
from generals statements on the potential of a zone-strategy in the FOCAC documentation 
and the latest Ethiopian Five Year Plan, the GTP, there is no available documentation on the 
specific goals, incentives, preferential treatments and division of responsibility. The past 
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experience of SEZs have shown that unless zones are well-planned and well integrated into an 
overall development strategy they will not be successful, and therefore the lack of clear 
guidelines and rules is worrying. Aggarwal (2010) highlights that the weak policy frame, 
especially concerning land acquisition rights, has impaired the development potential of 
Indian SEZs - a problem that has already affected the EIZ as well. Due to the lack of policy, 
the firms in the zone have no rights to land title deeds, which negatively affect loan 
applications, construction permits and sub-leasing opportunities (The Ethiopian Herald 
2012b). Mr. Wu of the EIZ management stresses that issues like these cause uncertainties 
among investors which block investment opportunities (The Ethiopia Herald 2012a). Issues 
like these have to be solved, and a clearer policy frame created if the EIZ is to become a 
dynamic, leading sector that can pull the Ethiopian economy to development through 
unbalanced growth. Unless the EIZ improves its policy frame and becomes a well-planned 
zone that is well-integrated into the overall Ethiopian development plan, the development 
potential for the EIZ will be low.   
5.1.2 Ethiopia’s Labor Law 
Before moving on the analysis of the development potential established by the EIZ’s initial 
operation, a short note on the EIZ’s effect of the Ethiopian labor standards is needed. One of 
the main critiques of SEZ-strategies is that it will induce a ‘race to the bottom’ through 
placing downward pressure on labor standards, as Jauch (2002) identifies this case in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia on the mid-1990. However, analysis of the Ethiopian policy frame 
shows no support for such a development in Ethiopia. No amendments have been made to the 
Labor Proclamation of 2003, which continues to govern the labor situation, and no other 
indication have been discovered that the EIZ enjoys a more lax labor-standard climate of e.g. 
fewer controls than the overall Ethiopian economy. These findings are in line with 
Cheesman’s (2012) and Milberg and Amengual’s (2008) research that downward pressure on 
labor standards from SEZs should be viewed as an exception rather than the norm.  
5.2 The initial phase of the EIZ 
5.2.1 Analysis of the enterprises in the EIZ 
Having established that the policy frame surrounding the EIZ is too weak to offer substantial 
development opportunities, the study now turns to analyzing the development potential 
generated by the initial operation of the EIZ. Despite the vague policies concerning objectives 
and management of the zone, some progress has taken place since the initiation of the zone in 
2007. The analysis of the initial phase of the EIZ has been carried out through analysis of the 
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12 firms that are reported to operate in the zone. The focus of the analysis is to establish the 
potential of each firm to create stimulating linkages to the local economy, i.e. to explore the 
inter-firm linkages. Through exploring the inter-firm linkages for each enterprise and jointly 
analyzing their development potential, it becomes possible for the study to draw conclusions 
on the potential the EIZ has to create inter-sectoral linkages between the EIZ (viewed as the 
leading sector) and the local Ethiopian economy (viewed as the following sector).  
 Table 1 displays the main characteristics of each firm in the EIZ, which has 
formed the basis of the analysis. The table includes the firm name, main product, industry 
sector
4
, year of entry into the EIZ, completed investment, technology level
5
, labor intensity
6
 
and extent of linkages created, where the three last entries form the main part of the analysis. 
The ‘extent of linkages’ has been classified according to Chenery and Watanabe’s (1956 in 
Hirschman 1958: 105) classification of degree of interdependence of various industries. Based 
on the ratio of inter-industry purchases to total production and the ratio of inter-industry sales 
to total demand, Chenery and Watanabe categories various industries into four categories of 
linkages-types: 
 Category 1: “Intermediate Manufacturer” - backward and forward linkages both high. 
 Category 2: “Final Manufacturer” - backward linkages high, forward linkages low. 
 Category 3: “Intermediate Primary Production” - forward linkages high, backward 
linkages low. 
 Category 4: “Final Primary Production” - backward and forward linkages both low.  
Based on the theoretical framework of this study, industries falling under category 2 “final 
manufacturer” would be the most conducive for development. These industries have high 
backward linkages that can stimulate the economy, which is in line with Hirshman’s “last 
stage industries first”. Furthermore, as the category includes the final manufacturing firms, the 
firms in this category are well suited to help Ethiopia embark on a development process of 
light manufacturing because the category includes sectors such as leather products, apparel, 
wood products and other light manufacturing industries. From Hirschman's perspective 
sectors falling under category 1 “intermediate manufacturer” are also beneficial for 
development, as this is the category which generates the most linkages (cf. Hirschman’s 1958: 
109 example of the steel industry generating the most linkages). However, if the EIZ is to 
                                                     
4
 The industry sector is identified according to the Standard Industrial Classification, SIC, based on the firms' 
main product. 
5
 The technology level has been classified according to Eurostat’s definition of low, medium, medium-high and 
high technology (Eurostat 2013). 
6
 The distinction on labor-intensity was based on Das and Kalita’s (2009) classification..  
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succeed based on a strategy of unbalanced growth, the quality of the linkages and the fit of the 
sectors with the Ethiopian context also needs to be considered. In light of this the sectors of 
category 1 are not as conducive for Ethiopia as the light manufacturing industries of category 
2. While Chenery and Watanabe’s categorization of sectoral interdependence is a useful 
foundation for this study, it should be noted that the input-output table cannot capture the 
nuanced picture that linkages represent. The categorization does not distinguish between the 
important, causal linkages and sector-interdependence where two sectors grown in tandem 
without any causal relationship. Even so, the categorization has been useful as a crude 
indication of the sectors that create linkages, which in combination with the focus on 
technology-level and labor-intensity, has enabled the study to analyze the development 
potential of the firms in the EIZ, based on theories drawn from unbalanced growth and global 
value chains.   
 
Table 1: The firms operating in the Eastern Industrial Zone 
Firm Firm operating 
in the EIZ7 
Main products Sector and SIC code EIZ 
entry 
year 
Completed 
investment 
Linkages Tech-
level 
Labor 
intensive 
1 L&J Engineering 
Co. Ltd. 
Construction cement 
products 
Manufacturing/Concrete 
products/ Cement, hydraulics 
SIC: 3241  
2010 $126 000 Cat 1 Medium No 
2 The headquarter 
of East Cement 
Share Company 
Administrative 
services, personnel 
management, sales, 
billing, logistics etc. 
Services/Business services 
SIC: 7389 
2006 ($60 
 million)8 
Cat 4 (service) (service) 
3 East Cement 
Leasing Company 
Construction 
equipment rental 
service 
Services/Heavy Construction 
Equipment Rental and 
Leasing 
SIC: 7353 
2008 $5.14 
million 
Cat 4 (service) (service) 
4 Chang Cheng 
Packaging Co Ltd. 
Woven bags and 
packaging material 
Paper and Allied products/ 
Packaging material 
SIC: 2671 
2010 $510 000 Cat 2 Low Yes 
5  Eastern Hotel Co.  Hotel services Services/Hotels 
SIC 7011 
2008 $500 000 Cat 4 (service) (service) 
6  LQ4 Pipe 
Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd.  
Steel pipes Manufacturing/Primary 
Metal 
SIC: 3317 
2010 $9 million Cat 1 Medium No 
7 Eastern Steel Co. Steel bars and steel 
wire 
Manufacturing/ Steel works 
SIC 3312 
n.a. $54 million Cat 1 Medium No 
8 Yulong 
Technology 
Building 
Materials Co. Ltd 
Gypsum board, 
 gypsum powder, 
 gypsum blocks 
Manufacturing/ Concrete 
Products/ Gypsum Products 
SIC 3273 
2010 $420 000 Cat 1 Medium No 
                                                     
7
 Based on data from the Qiyuan Group, the EIZ management and media report. Firm 1-8 were reported by both 
the EIZ management and the Qiyuan Group to operate in the zone, the double occurrence assuring the existence 
of these firms in the EIZ. Five additional firms were reported only by the Qiyuan Group. Two of these were 
assumed to parallel firm 3 and 4, based on similarity in name and investment size, and the existence of firm 10 in 
the EIZ is confirmed by Goh and Geiger (2012b). However, as the author as unable to confirm the operation of 
Mustang Cars and East Caiyang in the EIZ, these two firms are not included in the analysis. Firm 11 and 12 were 
included based on news entries reported both from the Qiyuan Group webpage and the EIZ webpage. As most 
information about the zone report that there are around about 10 firms, the resulting list of 12 companies appears 
plausible.  
8
 This concerns the whole company, in which the CAD-Fund own 40%, and not only the headquarter located in 
EIZ. 
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9  Zhong Shun 
Cement 
Manufacturing 
Co.,Ltd. 
Cement production Manufacturing/ 
Concrete products/ Cement, 
hydraulics 
SIC: 3241  
2008 $11 million Cat 1 Medium No 
10  Hua Jian Shoe Co 
Ltd 
Leather shoes Wholesale trade/ Footwear 
SIC 3711 
2011 n.a. Cat 2 Low Yes 
11  Changfa 
Agricultural 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 
Agricultural 
equipment e.g. 
tractors, harvesters 
and engines 
Manufacturing/ Farm 
machinery and equipment  
SIC 3523 
2011 n.a. Cat 2 Medium-
high 
No 
12 Higer Pickup KD Pickups  Manufacturing/ Motor 
Vehicles Passenger cars 
SIC 3711 
2011 n.a. Cat 2 Medium-
high 
No 
Source: Authors compilation based on information provided by the Qiyuan Group, the EIZ web page and news 
clippings. 
 
As can be seen from table 1, the firms in the zone appear to offer little development potential 
for Ethiopia, based on the few backward linkages created and the lack of low-tech, labor-
intensive sectors that can ease Ethiopia’s insertion into the global value chain. Only 4 out of 
the 12 firms are within category 1 of strong backward linkages (firm 4, 10, 11 and 12), and 
only firm 2 and 10 represent sectors that are low-tech, labor-intensive and can offer an 
opportunity for Ethiopia to join the global value chain. Low-tech, labor intensive firms offer 
the most developmental potential, in particular if they are connected to the country’s 
comparative advantage. As is further discussed in section 5.4, this would imply firms within 
the leather, apparel and furniture sectors in Ethiopia, as these three areas fit both the criteria 
for entering the global value chain and the Ethiopian context. As is evident in table 1, only 
one firm, Hua Jian Shoe, fall within this span of suitable ‘last stage industries’. 
While the current study argues that it would be more beneficial for Ethiopia to 
target low-tech, labor-intensive sectors first in order to create a dynamic economic growth of 
these sectors within the EIZ, it recognizes that such an argument limits the potential for the 
EIZ to be a tool for technology transfers. However, Kokko et al (1994) find that the potential 
for technology transfer to occur is greatest when there is moderate - not large - technology 
gap between the incoming investment and host economy. Given the limited development of 
Ethiopia’s technology level to date, it would be better for Ethiopia to attract lower-level 
technologies as it is better to have transfer of those types of technology, but to attract high-
tech investments that cannot be absorbed due to technology incompatibility. 
As further displayed by the table, one of the main products of the EIZ is cement. 
While increased domestic production of cement is part of the GTP-goals, cement is not a 
conducive ‘last stage industry’ (GTP 2010). In addition to creating strong backward linkages, 
last stage industries have additional developmental effects of creating “new demand” in the 
way the output of these industries can be used as input in a new industry (Hirschman 1958: 
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68). Increased demand of cement from the construction sector will increase the production of 
cement, but it will do so in a static way, without creating new complementarities or linkages 
like a last stage industry has the potential to do.  
The main result of table 1 is that most of the firms in the EIZ are not “last stage 
industries” nor light manufacturing industries, and therefore the EIZ will not create enough 
backward linkages for the EIZ to be a leading sector in a strategy of unbalanced growth nor 
facilitate Ethiopia’s insertion into the global value chain.  
5.2.2 The EIZ-enterprises and the global value chain 
Out of the enterprises in the zone, Hua Jian Shoe offer the largest development potential for 
facilitating Ethiopia’s insertion into the global value chain, being a low-tech, labor-intensive 
firm within the leather sector. Therefore, it will be illuminating to further investigate Hua 
Jian’s EIZ experience as example of how firms from the sector of high development potential 
experience the EIZ. Hua Jian Shoe currently has two production lines in the EIZ. It produces 
2000 pairs of shoes per day for the U.S. and European markets and employs about 600 
workers, most of which are Ethiopians (Geiger and Goh 2012b). As part of a larger study of 
Chinese firms in Ethiopia, Geiger and Goh (2012b) carried out a small case study of Hua Jian 
Shoe. Among other findings, the case study identified the current obstacles Hua Jian are 
experiencing, and noted the following challenges: 1) difficulties in keeping the production 
chain as lean and short as in China, 2) unpredictable customs clearance time, 3) total logistics 
cost, labor cost, and rental cost are not as competitive as planned, and are often higher than in 
China, and 4) Ethiopia’s underdeveloped infrastructure creates a challenging business 
environment. If the EIZ was successful in attracting more firms within the ‘last stage’-sector, 
it is likely that these companies would experience similar problems. Therefore, it is crucial 
that the EIZ management address the obstacles mentioned here so that a more favorable 
investment climate can be created. That would increase the EIZ’s chances of creating a 
dynamic growth process within the zone, which is crucial for the EIZ potential as a 
development tool.  
5.2.3 Short note on employment generation 
In most SEZ-strategies employment generation is viewed as an important aim. The EIZ is no 
exception, and is aimed at creating 20 000 jobs for Ethiopians (Geda and Meskel 2009). 
Employment generation has not been a specific aim of this study - as this study focuses on 
exploring the EIZ’s development potential through its interaction with the local economy (it’s 
catalytic effects) rather than its direct effect in the zone - it is worth mentioning that the 
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employment generation so far in the zone has been far below the target. The employment 
generation in the EIZ has been small as the EIZ has attracted far fewer enterprise than was 
planned. As Brautigam (2011) states, the EIZ was planned for 80 firms, but as seen from the 
above analysis only 12 firm are operating in the zone, making the aim of 20 000 jobs appear 
quite unrealistic. However, if the EIZ grows in size, the opportunities for greater employment 
generation are widespread. In their survey of Chinese firms in Ethiopia, Geiger and Goh 
(2012b) found that many of the companies generate ample employment opportunities, 
offering hope that Chinese invested firms in Ethiopia can generate employment. However, in 
order for the EIZ to be a development tool for Ethiopia, the EIZ need to spur employment 
generation both directly in the zone, but also indirectly in the local Ethiopian economy. A 
shift in focus to sectors of strong backwards linkages, line with the argument of this study, 
would facilitate the EIZ’s opportunities to that and generate employment both in the EIZ and 
in the Ethiopian economy.  
5.3 The China-Ethiopia cooperation 
5.3.1 FOCAC 
The EIZ was first initiated as part of the Eight-Point Plan of the 3rd FOCAC meeting in 2006, 
when it was announced that China intended to set up 3-5 of its 50 planned overseas SEZs in 
Africa. The mention of the zone was brief, as in the 7th point China pledges to: “7. Set up 
three to five overseas economic and trade co-operation zones in African countries in the next 
three years” (FOCAC 2006). As evident by this extract, the FOCAC is a blunt tool of few 
specifics to govern the development of the EIZ. Following the analysis of the documentation 
from the five FOCAC meetings, Taylor’s (2012) critique of the forum, as discussed above, 
finds support. Taylor (2012) argues that the forum is a spectacle rather than a serious 
development platform, and as most of the documentation consists of positive statements of 
past achievements and future hopes but with few concrete examples of either, the critique may 
be correct. Each meeting specifies an action plan and follows up of the previous action plan, 
but the FOCAC even so fails to display a sense of actual cooperation but remains on a highly 
abstract, politically comfortable level. However, accepting the FOCAC as a grand, 
overarching initiative removed from the actual implementation of its specific initiatives, some 
development on the approach the Chinese-initiated SEZs in Africa can be found. The first 
statement concerning the subject was made at the first FOCAC in 2000 (FOCAC 2000: 5.3), 
when “the Chinese side agrees to share with African countries its experience in the field of 
investment promotion relating to the establishment and management of free and special 
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economic zones”. During the 12 years of FOCAC, this objective has been further developed. 
It now includes elements aiming to integrate the zone into the development strategies of the 
host countries so that the zones will “contribute towards rapid industrialization and economic 
restructuring in Africa”, and elements of linkage encouragement as “China will encourage 
enterprises joining the zones to increase links with local enterprises and communities, 
strengthen technology and experience sharing on the shop floor and enhance technology 
transfer and job creation.” (FOCAC 2012: 4.2.5). The main importance of the last FOCAC is 
the indication that the African countries are attempting to gain a greater say in the 
development initiative, evident by the increased focus on African benefits of the Chinese-
initiated zone. This parallels the process in Ethiopia, where it appears that the Ethiopian 
government is taking measures to increase its control over zone initiatives (in relation to the 
creation of the Bill to govern Ethiopia’s industrial zones). However, while it is promising that 
the FOCAC now includes a focus specifically relating to links with the local economy, 
technology transfer and employment generation, and that Ethiopia is attempting to gain more 
say in the zone-development, further work is still needed. The pace of improvements in the 
policy surrounding the Chinese-initiated SEZs needs to be quickened, so that the African 
development becomes a center focus. Only then can these zones be successful and avoid 
failing in the same manner as the domestic African SEZs of the 1990’s.  
5.3.2 The EIZ and the Chinese policy frame 
In addition the zone-related statements of the FOCAC, the Chinese overseas SEZs have been 
developed in relation to China’s “going global” policy first stated in the 11th Five Year Plan, 
2006-2010 and further developed by MOFCOM policy (Bernasconi-Osterwalder 2012). 
Beyond these overarching policies, the actual development of the zone is largely left to the 
Chinese firms developing the zones. Instead of being guided by specific targets and goals, the 
Chinese zone developers are guided through the various incentives they are able to apply for. 
These incentives are handled by various levels of government, and the Qiyuan Group is able 
to seek support from the provincial (Jiangsu), municipal (Suzhou) and city-level 
(Zhangjiagang) government (Zhangjiagang Daily 2008). As such, the EIZ is not well-
anchored in the Chinese policy frame so far, but it can more be viewed as more of an 
experimental development strategy where the Chinese government has placed the lion share 
of the responsibility with the Chinese firm developing the zone.  
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5.3.3 Ethiopia’s role in the cooperation  
While the Chinese government appears to have placed the lion-share of responsibility with the 
Chinese zone developers, the Ethiopian government appears to have placed the lion share of 
the responsibility of the EIZ with the Chinese stakeholders. This is evident by that Ethiopian 
government did not claim any share of the ownership of the EIZ, leaving the EIZ to be 100 % 
Chinese owned, compared to e.g. the Nigerian government that claimed 40% of the shares in 
their Chinese-initiated SEZ (Farole 2011:197). This lack of engagement from the Ethiopian 
side is in stark contrast to how China handled their own SEZ in the 1980’s, where the Chinese 
state was strongly present in all zone-activities. In the Ethiopian case however, the Ethiopian 
government has done little so far but to provide land, permits and off-site infrastructure and 
acting as a spokesperson for the mutual trust all parties have in the project (The Absentee 
Landlord 2012, EIZ 2012: 2, 15, 20). Reinstating confidence in the EIZ as a mutual win-win 
concept will not ensure its success, but instead the Ethiopian government need do more in 
order to secure the mutual development of the project that was promised at FOCAC 2005. 
The recent initiatives to regain say in the development of the EIZ, such as the forthcoming bill 
to govern the county’s industrial zone, is one step in the right direction, but more could be 
done. One measure could be to include more Ethiopian representatives in the EIZ 
management. No official information has been released regarding the composition of the 
management team of the EIZ, but the sourcing of this study suggest that it is all, or near-all, 
Chinese. Another measure that could be taken to increase the Ethiopian say in the direction of 
the EIZ would be for the Ethiopian government to exercise more pressure on which sectors 
are in the zone. In the PASDEP and GTP plans, a number of strategic sub-sectors are 
specified that Ethiopia wants to pursue, but only one of these (cement) are currently 
represented in the zone. More thorough encouragement of aligning the EIZ with the Ethiopian 
interests would be one way of avoiding Ethiopian interest being trumped by Chinese interests.  
The Ethiopian government could and should increase its effort to play a decisive 
part in the development of the EIZ. As evident by the Investment Proclamation (769/2012), 
the government recognizes the importance of both governing incoming investment and the 
importance of industrial zones to facilitate development, and this recognition now needs to be 
translated into a more active role in the government in the EIZ. For the EIZ to be a tool for 
development the Ethiopian government cannot lean back and trust the Chinese government 
while the Chinese government is placing its trust in the Chinese zone developer. The Qiyuan 
Group does not have the capability to govern the EIZ as an Ethiopian development tool, but in 
38 
 
order for that to happen all three stakeholders need to come together and all work towards the 
success of the EIZ.   
5.4 The Ethiopian context 
5.4.1 The EIZ within Ethiopia’s policy frame 
In order for the EIZ to be successful, it needs to match the Ethiopian context. This study will 
first analyze the EIZ’s fit into Ethiopia’s policy frame, and secondly the EIZ’s fit into 
Ethiopia’s economic climate. Basing the analysis of the policy frame on the investment 
incentives provided by the Ethiopian government, this study finds that the EIZ is not well-
matched to Ethiopia’s policy frame. To analyze if there is a match between the EIZ and the 
Ethiopian context, the study has analyzed if the sectors that are in the EIZ correspond to the 
sectors that Ethiopia encourages foreign investment into. Sectors to which the Ethiopian 
government offer tax-exemptions have been classified as “encouraged”, while sectors that are 
not entitled to tax exemptions has been classified as “non-encouraged”9. The result of the 
analysis shows that many of the sectors that are represented in the EIZ fall under the category 
of “non-encouraged” sectors, such as the cement industry, the leather industry, certain metal-
industries, gypsum production, hotels and construction services. As 8/12
10
 of the enterprises 
in the zone belong to these sectors, the EIZ does not appear to be well matched to the 
Ethiopian context which impairs the EIZ potential for development.   
While a match with the Ethiopian context is a crucial aspect for the EIZ to 
succeed, the Ethiopian policy environment should not be viewed as “key” providing the 
correct answers as to which sectors should be encouraged. Before the EIZ is encouraged to 
align itself with the Ethiopian context, certain aspects of that context should be addressed. In 
the Investment Proclamation, tanning of hides and skins below finished level, sawmilling and 
timber making are all “non-encouraged” sectors. This obstructs the creation of backward 
linkages in the leather and timber sectors, two very important “last stage industries” in 
Ethiopia’s development process. The success of the theory of “last stage industries” hinges 
upon that the development of the final product-sectors stimulate the development of the 
sectors providing input for these sectors, e.g. that the development of the leather shoe industry 
will stimulate the development of the tanning industry. However, in order for the tanning 
industry to reap the benefits of this stimulus, investment is needed into the sector. Without 
investment, the domestic tanning industry will struggle to respond to the increased demand 
                                                     
9
 See appendix 1.  
10
 Firm 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 , 9 and 10. 
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for its products, due to lack of capital and skills in Ethiopia.  The increased demand for tanned 
skins and hides instead will be fulfilled by increased import, which diminishes the 
development potential for “last stage industries”. So, in order for the Ethiopian Investment 
Proclamation (no 769/2012) to fulfill its own goal of encouraging investment into the 
manufacturing sector and strengthen the domestic production capacity, the “non-
encouragements” of the tanning industry, sawmilling and timber making should be lifted.   
Beyond the sectors that are “non-encouraged”, certain sectors have been fully 
restricted from foreign entry
11
. The intention is to protect domestic initiatives from being 
“crowded out”, a notion that a number of scholars support (Brautigam 2012, Marysse & 
Geenen 2009: 392). However, it also restricts these sectors from gaining access to capital, 
demonstration effect and increased competition that could spur a process of increased quality, 
hampering the growth potential for firms in these sectors (Dihn et al 2012). In relation to the 
success of the EIZ, lifting the restriction of foreign investment in packaging, forwarding and 
shipping is of main importance, as that would improve the EIZ possibilities to be a trade 
facilitator. If Ethiopia is to successfully join the global value chain, the transport and freight 
cost need to be substantially lowered. Due to the low road density, poor railway network and 
high fuel cost, the transport costs are currently very high in Ethiopia (Dihn et al 2012). The 
capital, knowledge and competition that foreign investment could bring has the potential to 
improve this situation. 
As evident by the above discussion, there is a great need to better integrate the 
EIZ with the Ethiopian development strategy, as this is crucial for the success of the EIZ. 
However, if Ethiopia is to develop through a strategy of unbalanced growth and entry to the 
global value chain, elements of the Ethiopian development strategy needs to be altered to fit 
this strategy, so that backward linkages can be fostered.       
5.4.2 The EIZ and Ethiopia's economic climate 
This section is introduced by a short summary of Ethiopia’s current economic state, in order 
to address the EIZ’s fit with Ethiopia’s economic climate. In recent years Ethiopia’s economic 
development process has been governed by three large-scale government development plans: 
the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, SDPRP (2002/03-2004/05), 
the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, PASPED (2005/06-
                                                     
11
 These are: a) banking, insurance and micro-credit and saving services; b) packaging, forwarding and shipping 
agency services; c) broadcasting service; d) mass media services; e) attorney and legal consultancy services; f) 
preparation of indigenous traditional medicines; g) advertisement, promotion and translation works; h) air 
transport services using aircraft with a seating capacity up to 50 passengers (Regulation 679/2012) 
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2009/10), and the current Growth and Transformation Plan, (2010/11-2014/15). Through 
these plans, Ethiopia has managed to embark on a rapid growth process where the negative 
real GDP growth of 2002/03 of -3.3%, has been transformed into an average growth rate of 
10.6% annually 2004-2012, including a quick recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis 
(PASDEP 2005, Goh and Geiger 2012a, WDI 2013). The GDP/capita has increased to $513 
in 2011/12, inflation has been well-managed and has decreased from an average of 17% 
2003/04-2009/09 (primarily due to high food prices) to a 12-month moving average of 2.8% 
in 2009/2010, fiscal management has been prudent as the share of expenditure to GDP 
declined from 23.5% to 18.6% in 2009/10, the share of trade in GDP has increased from 10% 
of 50% in the last few years, and Ethiopia enjoys a stable macroeconomic climate (MOFED 
2012, WBI 2013,  MOFED 2010, GTP 2010). However, despite these positive developments, 
the Ethiopian economy still faces challenges. The industrial sector only accounts for 12.9% of 
the real GDP in 2009/10, while the agriculture and service sectors account for over 40% of 
GDP each - despite the focus on industrial development. The growth rate of the industrial 
sector did not meet its PASDEP-target of 11-18%, and within the industrial sector 
manufacturing only accounts for 5.5% of GDP and 5% of total exports (PASDEP 2005, GTP 
2010). In order for Ethiopia to transform the recent growth spurt into sustainable development 
the growth needs to be coupled with a structural transformation, but as these figures reveal 
that process is not currently happening in the country. Obstacles to a structural transformation 
led by light manufacturing - in line with the argument of this study - include the 
underdeveloped infrastructure (Ethiopia’s road density is 33.6 km/1000 km2 compared to the 
African average of above 50 km/1000km2), unreliable electric power (Ethiopia has an average 
of 5 power outages per month causing a 3 % sales value loss), expensive telecommunications, 
as well as the low domestic savings rate of 5% (World Bank 2011, PASDEP 2005). In light of 
this, a SEZ strategy of unbalanced growth is a useful tool for Ethiopian development, as it 
would enable foreign capital to compensate for the low domestic saving, so that efforts could 
be done to improve the infrastructure within the zone, which in turn can facilitate a dynamic 
economic growth and structural transformation.  
In order for the EIZ to maximize its development potential as a SEZ that can 
attract foreign capital and target development in a delimited area, in line with unbalanced 
growth, the EIZ should match Ethiopia’s comparative advantages. If the investments into the 
EIZ match Ethiopia’s comparative advantages, it will enable the creation of strong backward 
linkages to form with relative ease and speed, enlarging the EIZ development potential. 
According to the Global Development Solutions (2011), Ethiopia has comparative advantages 
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in leather, agribusiness, apparel, metal and wood - based on Ethiopia’s large labor pool, low 
wage level compared to other African countries and its natural resources. As these five sectors 
corresponds to UN Comtrade’s (2009) list of top exports from Ethiopia (where a high export 
is interpreted as a sign that the sector is well-functioning in Ethiopia), they have served as the 
base for analyzing if the EIZ firms match Ethiopia’s comparative advantages. However only 
three firms
12
 fall under one of these categories, and the EIZ therefore does not currently fit the 
Ethiopian context. Shifting the focus of the firms in the zone to be more in line with the 
argument of this study - that the development potential of the EIZ lies in being a tool for 
Ethiopia to focus of last stage industries of light manufacturing that fit the Ethiopian context - 
would significantly increase the prospect of the EIZ to be the high-growth sector it needs to 
be in order to spur a structural transformation based on unbalanced growth in Ethiopia. For 
this to happen, the firms in the zone should both fit the aim of being last stage industries that 
can facilitate Ethiopia’s entry into the global value chain (that is, low-tech and labor-
intensive), and fit the Ethiopian context and its comparative advantage. As Ethiopia has 
access to cattle, wood and cotton, the EIZ should aim to attract firms in the leather, apparel 
and furniture sector. If the EIZ can attract these types of firms, the EIZ can offer large 
development potential. 
Due to its high growth, low inflation, ample access to natural resources, low 
wage level and stable macroeconomic climate, Ethiopia is at a favorable position to reap the 
benefits that a SEZ-strategy can offer. However, the development potential of the EIZ will be 
greatest if it focuses on last stage industries such as light manufacturing, so that strong 
linkages between the zone and the local economy can be ensured and a structural 
transformation induced. At the current time this is not the case in the EIZ, and the EIZ is not 
living up to its potential as a development tool.  
6 Discussion 
As the analysis section of this study has displayed, the development potential for the EIZ is 
weak. The EIZ does not fit with the Ethiopian development frame, the Ethiopian development 
frame does not fit with the strategy of unbalanced growth, the cooperation between China and 
Ethiopia is not strong and the firms in the EIZ do not have the potential to spur strong 
backward linkages. On the other hand, Ethiopia is economically at a favorable position to reap 
the benefits of a zone-strategy due to its high growth, stable macroeconomic environment and 
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 Firm 6: metal, Firm 7: metal, Firm 10: leather.  
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good prospects to engage in conducive industries such as leather products, wood products and 
apparel due to its comparative advantage in these sectors. In order to tie these elements of data 
into a conclusion of the EIZ’s development potential according to the theoretical framework 
of this study, the four criteria that EIZ hinge upon will here be addressed, based on the data 
put forward in the above analysis.  
6.1 Criterion 1: The EIZ as an economically dynamic sector  
The first criterion in order for the EIZ to be a development tool according to an unbalanced 
growth strategy is that the EIZ is a dynamic economic sector that can be the leading sector in 
the economy. At the current state, however, the EIZ cannot be viewed as such a sector. So far 
the zone has attracted 12 firms - far below that of the planned 80 firms, and generated 2000-
3000 employment opportunities
13
 - far below the planned 20 000 (Geda and Meskel 2009). 
The total completed investment from these firms cannot be expected to be enough to induce a 
development process in the country of Ethiopia. Beyond the size of the zone, which does have 
the potential to grow in the coming years, the main problem is that the investment does not 
have enough potential for profit. Mr Wu of the EIZ management report that the return to 
investment for the EIZ is so low that the Qiyuan group has calculated that it will get their 
investment back and start of make profit in 22(!) years (The Ethiopian Herald 2012a). As 
evident, the EIZ has not attracted enough investment, firms and employment opportunities in 
order to be a dynamic leading sector. 
Despite the current gloomy state of the investment level in the EIZ, the EIZ has 
not lost its entire development potential. The zone was initiated in 2007, has been in operation 
since 2010 and is still in the process of completing its construction. Therefore the EIZ must 
now look to the future and ensure that the investment levels and economic dynamism can be 
induced in the coming years. If this happens, the EIZ still has the potential to be a tool for 
development in Ethiopia. One way of increasing the dynamism in the zone is to open the 
doors for small enterprises to move into the zone and benefit from the preferential treatments 
there. As table 1 display, all firms currently in the zone are large firm of quite substantial 
investment size. Dihn et al (2012) highlight that one of the key contributions of the domestic 
Chinese zones was to enable small firms to grow into dynamic medium-size firms. If this 
process could be replicated in the EIZ it would increase its potential to be a dynamic leading 
sector significantly. This notion is further supported by Söderbom (2012) who - using firm 
level data 1998-2008 - find that there is a direct link between firm size and productivity in 
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 Authors estimation based on data-extracts from the EIZ web page. 
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Ethiopia. While this is a quite common correlation due to better technology and management 
skills in larger firms, Söderbom finds that the correlation is strikingly high in Ethiopia. To 
draw on this potential and enable the many micro and small enterprises of Ethiopia to grow, 
would increase the EIZ’s development potential significantly. Furthermore, efforts of this type 
would also fit into the aims of FOCAC 2009, where the aim of the Chinese-initiated SEZs to 
“provide facilitation of African small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to develop their 
business in the zones” is added to the objectives of the zones (FOCAC 2009: 4.2.4). 
6.2 Criterion 2: The backwards linkages of the EIZ 
Similar to the discussion of criterion 1, the current state of the EIZ’s generation of backward 
linkages needs to be substantially increased if the zone is to be a development tool. Out of the 
firms in the zone, four firms are in the developmentally beneficial “category 2” of final 
manufacturing, while only two of those fit into the strategy of low-tech, labor-intensive 
sectors. As the strongest development potential through linkage-effects lies is generation of 
backward linkages that can stimulate the domestic production of input-industries, the future 
direction of the EIZ should be to attract more firms in the ‘last stage industries’. In addition to 
the mismatch between the firm in the zone and the general strategy of ‘last stage industries’, 
the firms in the zone should have a better match to Ethiopia’s economic context. If the firms 
in the zone are aligned with the comparative advantage of Ethiopia - such as the cotton, wood 
and leather sector - the creation of strong backward linkages would be facilitated. Backward 
linkages can develop even if the country does not have a comparative advantage in the 
promoted sectors, but they form quicker and stronger if the country does. Currently, only Hua 
Jian shoes fit the criterion of being a “category 2” industry with a large potential to spur a 
dynamic backward linkages to the domestic Ethiopian economy, specifically in the skins, 
hides and leather sector.   
One measure that can be taken to improve the backward linkages generated 
from the EIZ is to encourage e.g. firms within the furniture and wood product sector to invest 
in the zone. Ethiopia has an abundance of timber, and ample opportunities to expand this 
sector. However, despite the access, timber and bamboo cost double or triple that of bamboo 
from China and Vietnam (Dihn et al 2012). If the furniture sector was encouraged in line with 
Hirschman’s theory of promoting certain sectors, by e.g. inviting furniture enterprises into the 
EIZ, this would induce a higher demand for bamboo, create a domestic market to it and 
enable the domestic bamboo producers to benefit from economies of scale. As Ethiopia has 
access to bamboo it is likely that the backward linkages created from the encouraged furniture 
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sector would result in this type of domestic stimuli, rather than increased import of cheap 
bamboo from China and Vietnam. One measure to realize this development and encourage 
firms in the furniture, apparel and leather sectors is to increase the tax exemption for these 
sectors, and through that encouraged such investment into the zone.  
6.3 Criterion 3: The EIZ and the global value chain 
The third criterion for the EIZ to be a development tool is that it facilitates Ethiopia’s entry 
into the global value chain, through emphasis on light manufacturing industries as 
Hirschman’s (1958) concept of ‘last stage industries’. However, only Hua Jian Shoe and 
Chang Cheng Packaging are such ‘last stage industries’, where Hua Jian Shoe is the single 
one that also fit into the Ethiopian context. If the EIZ is to facilitate Ethiopia’s insertion into 
the global value chain, the emphasis of the firms in the zone needs to switch to last stage 
industries such as apparel and furniture. If e.g. textiles industries are in the zone, this would 
generate backward linkages to spinning and ginning industries, and to apparel accessories, in 
a way e.g. the cement firms that are currently in the zone do not.  
Encouraging textile apparel firms into the zone would significantly increase the 
EIZ’s development potential. When China and Vietnam embarked on their development 
processes through joining the global value chain, using industrial zones located next to ports 
was an important strategy in order to start their apparel production industries (Dihn et al 
2012). In China and Vietnam, the industrial zones became a tool to ease trade logistics and 
improve the nation’s competitiveness in the time-sensitive apparel sector. The EIZ has the 
potential to be a similar tool for Ethiopia, but the physical location of the EIZ may impair this 
development. The EIZ is located 800 km from the Djibouti port, the closest port to the 
landlocked Ethiopia, a location of few benefits: it is far from the port, relatively far from 
Addis Ababa (30 km), and not near to any other local universities and technology institutes 
(Brautigam and Tang 2011). Due to the opaque nature of the information on the EIZ, few 
clues can be discerned as to why the EIZ is located at its current position. Mr. Wu of the EIZ 
management argues that the location is beneficial as it is close to the highway to Port Djibouti 
and as labor can be draw from the Debre Zeit and Dukem cities (The Ethiopian Herald 
2012a). However, in light of the actual distance to the port and the fact that the Debre Zeit 
 and Dukem cities total population is just over 100 000 (of Ethiopia’s 90 million inhabitants), 
these arguments are not convincing. From the perspective of this study, the location of the 
EIZ offers few benefits. However, the drawbacks of the poor location can be eased through 
the supply of well-functioning infrastructure. Currently the infrastructure situation in Ethiopia 
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is quite poor, due to low road density, poor condition of the railroad network and high fuel 
prices, making shipping and freight expensive and time-consuming in Ethiopia (Dihn et al 
2012). If the EIZ is to work as trade facilitator in style of the Chinese and Vietnamese 
industrial zones, the cost and efficiency of transport in Ethiopia needs to be improved. One 
way of encouraging such a development would be to allow foreign investment into the 
shipping and forwarding, which is currently prohibited in Ethiopia. Opening up for 
investment and competition in this area could improve the transport services through 
increased capital flow and competition. 
Increasing infrastructure development is one measure to transform the EIZ into a 
tool for development by enabling it to facilitate Ethiopia’s entry into the global value chain. In 
addressing Ethiopia’s potential to embark on a development process led by light 
manufacturing, Dihn et al (2012) identifies a number of key issues that need to be dealt with 
in order for development to be successful, including issues in key input industries, poor trade 
logistics, and poor access to industrial land, finance and skills. The same issues need to be 
dealt with in order for Ethiopia to join the global value chain, and if certain improvements are 
made to, and around, the EIZ, the zone has the potential to play a role in this process. 
However, due the type of firms in the zone, the poor infrastructure and the removed location 
of the EIZ, significant improvements to the EIZ is needed before such a development can be 
realized.  
6.4 Criterion 4: Cooperation between the EIZ’s stakeholders 
The EIZ does not only represent a case study of a SEZ-strategy, but a case study of the 
specific situation where a foreign government has initiated the strategy in another national 
context. The fourth criterion of success of the EIZ as a development tool for Ethiopia is that 
the cooperation between the foreign and domestic interest work. As evident from the analysis 
of topic in section 5.3, the current situation of the stakeholder-cooperation is not conducive 
for EIZ success. Based on the policies surrounding the EIZ, it appears that the Ethiopian 
government has placed the lion share of the responsibility of the EIZ with the Chinese 
stakeholders, while the Chinese government has placed the responsibility with the main 
Chinese investor of the zone - leaving the Qiyuan Group with a larger share of the EIZ-
responsibility than it can be expected to handle. While the Qiyuan Group is a successful 
Chinese enterprise, it cannot be expected that a Chinese firm can carry the responsibility of 
the EIZ as a development tool successfully, given the sheer size of such a responsibility and 
especially since the Qiyuan Group had such a limited experience of the Ethiopian context 
46 
 
before the EIZ-investment. In order for the zone to be successful, the Ethiopian government 
should play a larger role, to guide and advise the Qiyuan Group. To date, the Ethiopian 
government has not actively aimed at playing such a role, but has resorted to giving lip-
service and praise for the zone in relation to important visits (EIZ 2013: 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 20). 
The lack of active cooperation and a strong role of the domestic government stand in stark 
contrast to how the dynamic economies of East Asia handled their development processes and 
attempts to induce structural change. Aryeetey and Moyo (2012) argue that a major difference 
between the African and East Asian development processes lies in the role and capabilities of 
the state. In East Asia, structural transformation was pursued in a systematic way led by a 
strong state, while most government in Africa have made no such systematic approach. In 
order for the EIZ to be successful, the Ethiopian government needs to aspire to increase its 
capability to play a decisive role for the development of the EIZ, so that the EIZ can be 
designed as tool for Ethiopian development, and not end up as an outlet for Chinese interests 
only. 
As addressed throughout the study, some improvements have been made 
recently through the upcoming Bill to govern all Ethiopia’s industrial zones and the statement 
in the Investment Proclamation (769/2012, article 33.2) that industrial zones should primarily 
be run by the federal government, not joint investments or the private sector. Recent 
initiatives like these indicate that the Ethiopian government is attempting to play a larger role 
in the country's industrial zone. The EIZ is Ethiopia’s first and largest zone, and it would be 
highly beneficial for its development if the increased interest of the government to guide the 
zone development also will include the EIZ. 
In order for there to be more fruitful cooperation between the three stakeholders 
of the EIZ, the channels of communication need to be improved. To date there is no 
governmental organ in Ethiopia specifically in charge of the EIZ (while such an organ is 
mentioned in the draft of the upcoming Bill to govern Ethiopia’s zone), that could provide a 
forum for communication between the stakeholders. The EIZ management does not provide 
such a channel either, as the management is Chinese run with few or no Ethiopian 
representatives. Without a forum for communication, the dialog between the stakeholders 
suffers. The lack of good cooperation and communication can be exemplified by the 
following remark from Mr. Wu of the EIZ management to the Ethiopian Herald: “We kindly 
request Ethiopian government give us more incentives in order to get investment back in short 
time” (The Ethiopian Herald 2012a) The EIZ management should not have to resort to the 
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media in order to express such a wish to the Ethiopian government, and occurrence that they 
do indicates that the EIZ lacks an open channel of communication between its stakeholders.    
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The case study of Ethiopia’s Chinese-initiated Eastern Industrial Zone has shown that the 
development potential of the zone in its current state is limited. The analysis of the four data 
areas has showed that 1) EIZ’s policy frame is not strong enough to successfully govern the 
zone, 2) the initial phase of EIZ operation have not focused on enterprise-types conducive to 
development, 3) the stakeholder cooperation between the Chinese and Ethiopian actors is 
largely non-existent and 4) the EIZ do not take advantage of Ethiopia’s economic context of 
high growth and favorable position to embark on a development process led by light 
manufacturing. As such, the study has shown that the EIZ do not fulfill the four criteria for a 
successful development process led by a SEZ as a strategy of unbalanced growth. The EIZ is 
not economically dynamic enough to be the leading sector within such a strategy as the zone-
sector not attracted enough capital and investment, as the zone only host 12 enterprises and as 
the physical location of the zone is non-beneficial. Furthermore, the enterprises in the zone do 
not create strong backward linkages as they do not match the need for ‘last stage industries’, 
nor do they match the Ethiopian context in terms of Ethiopia’s comparative advantage. Hua 
Jian Shoe is the one firm in the zone that matches these criteria, but it cannot create sufficient 
backward linkages from the EIZ to the Ethiopian economy on its own – more firms of this 
type is needed. The enterprises currently in the EIZ will not facilitate Ethiopia’s entry into the 
global value chain due to the lack of firms in labor-intensive, low-tech sectors. The entry into 
the global value chain is further restricted by the poor infrastructure connecting the zone to 
the domestic economy and the international market, diminishing the potential for the EIZ as a 
trade facilitator in the way China and Vietnam used SEZs to enable their entry into the global 
value chain.  Finally, the fourth EIZ-specific criterion of a working cooperation between the 
main stakeholders of the zone is not fulfilled either. Due to the lack of a guiding framework 
stipulating the policies and objectives of the EIZ, and the lack of communication channels, the 
EIZ is not reaping the benefits that its multiple stakeholders could bring. The cooperation 
between the Ethiopian government with its knowledge of the Ethiopian context and the 
Chinese government with its successful SEZ experience should be able to support the Qiyuan 
Group in its EIZ development, but poor development of the EIZ so far is an indication that 
such cooperation is not taking place. If the aspect that the EIZ is Chinese-initiated is to be 
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beneficial, the zone needs a more clearly specified frame for its Chinese and Ethiopian 
stakeholders.  
 While the study has shown that the EIZ in its current state is not conducive for 
Ethiopian development, the study has also shown how a well-functioning SEZ can be a strong 
development tool. The theoretical contribution of the current study is large, as it has 
developed a frame for understanding how SEZs have the potential to lead to development. By 
viewing SEZs as a tool within an unbalanced growth strategy the study has shown how the 
SEZ can be a conducive development tool in its own right, beyond being a ‘second-best 
policy’ in the road to full liberalization. The theoretical framework of the study has clarified 
how a SEZ, such as the EIZ, can be a tool for development through aiding the process of a 
structural transformation, by specifying four criteria that zone-success hinges upon (where 
criterion 1-3 are of main importance in a wider SEZ-context). The approach of applying 
Hirschman’s (1958) theory on unbalanced growth to SEZs, and incorporating the current 
global context through the extension of the global value chains-perspective offers an 
important contribution to the theoretical debate on SEZs, as reviewed in section 2.2. The 
theoretical framework builds on the interesting idea put forward by the emphasis of ‘catalytic’ 
zone effects, and shows how these indirect effects can actually stimulate the local economy 
outside the zone. Through the specified criteria and on the foundation of Hirschman’s 
unbalanced growth theory, the study clarifies the vague emphasis of ‘links’ and ‘zone 
integration’, popular in the current debate, and translates it into a researchable focus. Viewing 
SEZs as a strategy within an unbalanced growth strategy in an innovative approach to the 
debate on SEZs, and further research on the development potential of SEZ could benefit from 
applying a similar approach. 
7.1 Policy implications 
The study argues that SEZs have the potential to be tools for development as part of an 
unbalanced growth strategy, but in order for the Ethiopian EIZ to realize that potential, certain 
improvements are need. The study has specified a number of policy implications that can aid 
the EIZ transformation’s into a successful Special Economic Zone and development tool. 
 In order to attract firms conducive for development – that is, last stage industries 
with the potential for entry in to the global value chain, which also fit Ethiopia’s comparative 
advantages – the EIZ should aim at attracting firms within the leather, apparel and furniture 
sector. This could be done through measures of encouraging small firms within these sectors 
to move into the zone, by e.g. offering targeted incentives to such firms, in line with 
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Söderbom (2012). Furthermore, the Ethiopian policy frame needs to be accommodating to the 
input industries of these sectors, which implies reforms in certain part of the investment 
incentives. The non-encouragement of the tanning, sawmilling and timber making sector 
should be lifted, to enable the growth of the leather and furniture sector through incoming 
capital. As for the apparel sector, the export ban of cotton (as reported by Dihn et al 2012), 
should be lifted, as it discourages investment into the cotton sector, so that conducive linkages 
can be created between a growing apparel sector and a growing cotton industry. 
  The EIZ’s removed location of 800 km from the Djibouti port should be 
compensated for by a well-functioning infrastructure if the EIZ is to be a trade facilitator that 
can ease Ethiopia’s entry into the global value chain. In the EIZ-case, the Chinese 
engagement in Ethiopia can be a tool for this, as the incoming Chinese capital into the country 
can compensate for the low domestic saving, and generate funds for infrastructure-
improvements. In addition to improvements of the hard infrastructure of roads and railroads, 
the EIZ’s role as a trade facilitator would be increased by efficiency gains in the transport, 
shipping and freight sector. To ensure such improvement, the restriction of foreign entry in to 
the sector should be softened, so that increased capital access and competition can spur 
improvements in the sector.  
 Furthermore, the cooperation between the stakeholders needs to be improved if 
the EIZ is to work, which calls for the creation of communication channels and of a well-
specified framework for the cooperation. The upcoming Bill to govern Ethiopia’s industrial 
zones is not enough, but the three stakeholders of the zone need to jointly specify the 
objectives and the actions that should be taken to fulfill those objectives. As past SEZ-
experience has shown, a well-planned SEZ-strategy is crucial to success, and in the EIZ-case 
this plan should be specified by its three main actors.  
 The first criterion of SEZ success is that it attracts enough investments and 
capital to ensure that the zone-economy can be the leading sector in the economy. For many 
countries applying a SEZ-strategy this is the most difficulty criterion to fulfill, as the SEZ in 
itself is a tool to spur dynamic growth when such growth is scare. As such, prescribing clear 
policy implications for how Ethiopia can ensure dynamic growth in the EIZ is beyond the 
capability of this research. However, one way of creating an enabling investment climate in 
the EIZ that can spur economic dynamism is to draw on the experience of the most promising 
firm (according to the framework of this study), in the zone currently, the Hua Jian Shoe. Hua 
Jian Shoe has identified four major obstacles to a successful economic development in the 
EIZ, and by addressing these challenges, it is likely that more companies of this conducive 
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type will be attracted to the zone. Hua Jian’s main challenges in the EIZ include the high 
logistics and rental costs, the low labor productivity and low labor skill level, the 
underdeveloped Ethiopian infrastructure, the unpredictable customs clearance time and the 
challenging business environment in Ethiopia. If these challenges are addressed in tandem 
with the above prescribed policies implication of certain changes in the investment incentives, 
infrastructure development and improved cooperation between the stakeholders, the Eastern 
Industrial Zone has the potential to become a development tool as a Special Economic Zone 
within a strategy of unbalanced growth.   
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Appendix 1 
List of encouraged/non-encouraged sectors in Regulation 270/2012: “Regulations on 
investment incentives and investment areas reserved for domestic investors”. While the 
previous regulation on investment incentives (Regulation no 84/2003), governed Ethiopia 
during the EIZ’s first years, the two regulations overlap to a large extent, and analysis of the 
current context was prioritized. 
Encouraged industries:  
 Food  
 Beverages 
 Textile and textile products 
 Wood products  
 Paper and paper products 
 Chemical and Chemical products  
 Basic pharmaceutical products 
 Rubber and plastics products 
 Basic metal industry 
 Fabricated metal products 
 Computers, electronics and optical 
products 
 Electrical products 
 Machinery and Equipments 
 Vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 Animal production 
 
 
 
Non-encouraged industries:  
 Leather and leather products, 
particularly tanning of hides and 
skins below finished level 
 The printing industry 
 Manufacture of cement 
 Manufacture of clay and cement 
products 
 Manufacture of lime, gypsum and 
similar coatings  
 Certain crop products (e.g. cereal, 
leguminous crops, oil seeds, fiber 
crops, , fruits and beverage crops) 
 The forest industry 
  Hotels and tourism 
 Construction contracting 
 Real-estate development 
 Education and training 
 Health services 
 Architectural and Engineering 
works 
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